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INTRODUCTION - THE STATUS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
cc
A. The Divorce Between Science and Philosophy.
For a consideralele number of years it has been
the firtiion to treat science and philosophy as though
they were estranged acquaintances whom it would be
bad form to invite to one and "the same social function.
We have scrupulously set forth our theory and scrupu-
lously conformed to our principle that, since science
has a distinctive aim and method of its own, ^;^lien we
are dealing with a subject which has been labeled
scientific we must beware that borderland lest we
trespass into the field of philosophy and allow our
scientific pontifical robes to become contaminated with
foreign matter. On the other hand, philosophy, having
suffered at the hands of tliose \riio mistook scientific
description for explanation, has, indeed, been willing
to use some of the older, more commonly established
lower levels of data of science, but has been known
to hold up a warning finger against the investigations
of science in areas of experience which ^e claims as her
o'vm distinctively, building many of her speculations
upon thin air lest her foot tread upon the area of
scientific description of facts. In scientific research
we invariably steer away from philosophical considerations.
€C
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and in philosophy we sometimes build from the roof
down rather than from the foundation up; and at the
same time we make insufficient provision for the
interpretation of science through philosophy and for
the grounding of philosophy upon actual experience.
B. Inter-relation of the Two and the Peculiar
Province of Psychology.
A moment's reflection upon the history of
science, iiowever, mil convince us:
(1) That all sciences at some stage or another
enter the field of philosophy. That frontier sciences
must blaze their way through uncleared forests of
philosophical assumptions* sometimes at iiie cost of
excQKL'iiunicati on or martyrdom. It is only vdien the
path has been cleaired and a solid highway prepared by
the establishment of philosophical p rinciples that the
sciences may carry on their traffic unimpeded. All the
sciences rest eternally upon a few fundamental philosoph-
ical axioms, such as "that of the integrity or consistency
of truth, the universal reign of law»
(2) That Psychology is such a frontier science as
we have mentioned; just now compelled even by some of its
ovm household to fight for the privilege of
r
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extending its research into larger and more signifi-
cant fields*
(3) That Psychology is peculiarly a "border-line
science Tiaich handles many of the same materials as
do Philosophy and Theology, and that in order to see
its objects \'\^ole and in their organic relations, it
is unprepared to perform the delicate if not impossi'ble
operation of severing all of the intricate connections
between them and their backgrounds. Indeed, I think
we may say, if the thesis of our present study is
granted, that at the highest point of Psychology,
science and philosophy also reach tlrieir highest point
and are fused. This is true if the data of conscious-
ness sind organization of experience are admitted to the
province of science.
C« The Doctrine of Levels and the Principle of
Wholes, and Their Significance in the "Osmotic
Process** Between Science and Philosophy
Through Psychology*
A proposal of this thesis is that the levels of
experience commonly dealt with only by philosophy are
subject to scientific law and therefore amenable to
tA
scientific investigation and that the personal "i/^oles**
of philosophy are effective agents, and therefore
scientific data*
It is safe to say that liiat the remarka"ble
progress made in scientific research during the last
half century has been largely due to the clear defini-
tion of the problem and method, marking a clear line of
division b etween the provinces of science and philosophy.
It was a safeguard against the confusion of issues and
it liberated science from the thraldom of mere specula-
tion. All honor to the spirit of science vihich prefers
the facts firstl If we must choose between the facts
and a cherished system, shall we not take the facts
and let the system go? But then we shall make a mi^ty
effort to grow a new one in its place, articulating tiie
facts with tliose that made up the former system. There
is a place for philosophy as well as science. ¥e are
obligated by the scientific psychological law of inte-
gration to construct the best systems we caxi out of the
facts at hand; and every system that properly uses
and synthesizes the faci.s at hand approximates in some
degree the vihole truth.
In other words, the demarcation between the
-f
fields of science and philosophy has been valuable
chiefly because it has stimulated the enlargement of
the body of facts. But the lines of division sire
less stable than commonly supposed: frontier sciences
especially must clear away philosophical jungle; and if
philosophy is to be a systematizing of all the facts
presented by science, it is clear that there must be
an area of synthesis or of "osmotic cantact" (Professor
Stricklajid * s phrase) that unites the two fields. We
have been so accustomed to sharp lines drawn Ijetween
the two approaches that not all students appreciate
the values of studies in a combined field. There is
dangsr in the complete separation* The scientist may
come to confine his research to some one or two levels
of data, and so to limit his apperceptive system that
he cannot apprehend the larger whole. On the other hsuid,
the philosopher, keen to uphold the accepted rules of
the game which in the past have protected his realm
from depredation, may build his sytem upon too small
a body of facts* The farther away we move from the
ground of facts the less likely are our conclusions to
be valid. Hence the value of the recognition of levels
ajid the extension of the reverent scientific spirit into
the higher realms vAiere science and philosophy meet*

The past emphasis upon separation has "brougiht
about a psychological state miich amounts in many cases
to a taboo against the synthetic field. As a result*
the latter is not now largely occupied at its strategic
center. The present situation, then, in thejTield of
psychology seems to call for more attention and
larger research at this point. The hour has struck
for recognition s»d of the possibility and necessity
for "osmosis". When this takes place, a new world to
conquer will be opened to "the eyes of some psychologists
of ttie physiological school; and personalism as a
philosophy and religion as a recognition and practice
of values will|occupy their rightful respected status
in the academic thought of the world*
A differing purpose and method will still direct
science and philosophy proper. The primaxy purpose of
the former will continue to be the acquision of descrip-
tiT8 facts, and its primary method will be experimental;
•Ato.ile the purpose of the latter will be, as now, the
synthesis of the facts presented by science proper.
We must still insist upon the refusal to substitute the
one for the other. The change in attitude will b e the
1 I
removal of the taboo upon the "osmotic process"
"between science suid philosophy as they meet in
psychology. The recognition of the philosophical
principle of wholes and levels will remove the
''blind spot** from the eyes of materialistic scientists
and will permit the pushing of the scientific method
over into the higher, ultimately even the highest
levels of experience, so that the resulting philosophy
will be basically a scientific construction. It is
at ttie peak of "this process that science, philosphy
religion, and art beox)me one*
In this study, then, we shall not hesitate,
wiien necessary, to clear away the philosophical debris
in our pathway and to point out the road -siAiich really
does lead to a higher plateau for scientific explorati
Our aim will not be to develop a philosophy.
We cannot enter into the details of establishment of
our personali Stic philosophical position. Rather we
would show the psychological foundation for our
philosophy. We would discover the unique as well as
the general contribution of the larger psychology to
philosophy and bring into the focus of our attention
the points of contact between the scientific and the
philosophical in the matter of personality building*
^I.
I.
<
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Our interest here is primarily psychological; and in
a correlative manner we are concerned with the ssife-
gtiarding of philosophy against mere speculation and
against insincerity by insistence upon a scientific
basis of fact in an unhampered sense*

II.
The Evolution of Selfhood
A Theory of Evolution

10.
A* The Evolution Idea.
It is a passion for meanings -vrtiich has given rise
to theories of evolution as well as to the apocalyptist *8
dream. The concept of evolution is fundamentally an
insight into the relations of things. The principle is
so patent, so inherent in the rational processes them-
selves, so innate a character in all experience, and
especially today built so integrally into our thou^t
structure that we can scarcely isolate it.
It is not surprising, then, liiat we find very early
attempts to order experience in thought according to
this principle. Evolutionary theory might "be said to
be an attempt to account for rational relations in the
midst of continual change, or more specifically, to
indicate and to systematize genetic relations. Such
attempts are recorded as having been made by the
Egyptiauis. The earliest Greek evolutionist whom we
know is Anaximander (570 B.C.) who taught that reality
is "the transformation of indestructible substance."
Heraclitus (540-480 B.C.) interpreted reality in terms
of strife, and change in terms of two opposing principles.
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harmony and strife. Empedocles (495-435 B.C.) gave
this theory a psychical turn by designating the con-
flictirgprinciples of reality as love and hate, or
attraction and repulsion. Democritus (460-360 B.C.)
was a materialist who traced origins and consistency
of all things to atoms. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) is
quite modern. To him organic life is progression in
the direction of complexity toward its final end, man.
The Stoic philosophers (336-110 B.C.) found the genesis
of all things in an original being both material (fire)
and spiritual (Deity) in nature, so that all things
are an expression of this being in its two aspects.
Lucretius (99-55 B.C.) might almost have stepped out
of the late 19th century. For him vegetable and animal
life is an evolution from the inorganic (Mother Earth);
maji develops from the animajal-like into civilization.
Lucretius has something of the scientific spirit in
tracing the sequences in these developments. Plotinus
(204-270 A.D.) reacted from the biological viewpoint of
Lucretius by an emphasis upon the psychological factors
in the evolution from the material to the spiritual.
In more modern times, the philosophy of Kant
(1724-1804), Schelling (1775-1854) and Schopenhauer
(1788-1860), anticipated the scientific contributions
r5
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of Darwin, Wallace, Spencer, and Huxley. Kant had
seen a direction in evolution from the chaotic and
simple to the refined complex, with the individual and
personal as objective. He explained this movement by
the principle of creation. The work of the late 19th
century scientists, -which attempted to describe the
mode of evolution, stimulated philosophical thou^t con-
cerning the effective agent or principle in the process.
The product of this period was liie "vitalism" of
Bergson and Driesch; T^ile criticism of both of these
lines of development has since produced the tlieories
of "emergence** and "psycho tropism".
Today, the idea of evolution is more consciously
and definitely controlling our thought and motivating
our activity titian ever before, because of the accumula-
tion of scientific evidence of the fact, Tiiich is
derived from the following sources, as summarized by
1
Newman
:
!• Paleontology - the evidence afforded by a study
of the distribution in time (vertical distribution in
the earth»s strata) of fossil remains of extinct animals
aJid plants*
1 Nevnnan, Readings in Evolution, p. 60
1 < 1
c
1
t
13»
II. Geographic distri-Qution - the evidence
afforded "by present (also, to some extent, past)
horizontal distribution of contemporaneous animals
and plants*
III. Classification - the evidence tliat the
present groups of animals and plants have arisen by
"descent with modification", n^ich is an evolutionary
conception*
IV. Comparative anatomy (homologies and vestigial
structures) - the evidence derived from the fact that
structures in unlike organisms have a common plan and
mode of origin; that changes have occurred ishich are
in some way related to changes of habit or environment*
V. Serology (blood transfusion tests) - the evi-
dence liiat the chemical specificity of the blood
parallels the taxonomic specificity*
VI. Embryology (the doctrine of recapitulation) -
evidence that the embryonic development of the individual
follows the main outlines of the evolutionary hi story
of its ancestors*
VII. Experimental evolution (Genetics) - the
evidence that heritable variations can be produced
experimentally and that these are of the same general
1
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character as those viiiich occur spontaneously in Nature.
We would add a philosophical argument for evolu-
tion to the evidence presented hy science, namely, the
demands of axiology, ^lilich are for the realization of
values through achievement. Evolution, to a greater
or less degree fulfills this need, for implicitly, even
though the fact may be disavowed, every scientific
theory proffered us involves some kind of values, even
if reduced to the lowest terms. We hold that even Uie
simplest adjustment vsdues involve teleology.
B. Scientific Theories of Evolution.
The early formulations of evolutionary theory were
chiefly philosophical and speculative in their approach*
Indeed, no theory is complete until its philosophical
ajid practical implications have been examined. But
science has rendered an incalculable service in providing
a ba^is of fact for philosophy's use. As Coulter says,
•'Pacts are like stepping stones. So long as one can
get a reasonably close series of them, he can make
progress in a given direction; but when he steps beyond
then he flounders. As -one travels away from a fact
its significance in any conclusion becomes more atten-
uated, until presently the vanishing point is reached.

15»
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li]£e the rays of light from a candle." VThen facts are
established, then explanations are in order*
We shall see presently how the scientific spirit
and methods were developed largely through the great
scientific students of evolution; how Lamarck and, far
more especially, Darwin and Wallace and their immediate
successors pursued the method of observation and infer-
ence to its limits and sometimes beyond. V/e shall see
how Weismann, De Vries, and Mendel, et al., have
established the experimental method together with its
concomitaJit , scientific analysis, and it is to be hoped
that we shall appreciate to some extent the inestimable
and revolutionary contribution which they have made to
a world of thought and practice and to destiny.
Lamarck (1744-1829) developed the concept of adap-
tation in the Theory of Use and Disuse. He assumed
that all orgsinisms have some power of adaptation to
environment. Those who have such power in a sufficient
degree survive, and transmit the modifications vAiich
environment has produced in them to their progeny.
This theory does not necessitate the extinction of old
types. The process of modification of the individual
involves, in Lamarck »s thought, the following stepa:-
change of environment or habit » the appearance of a new
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need, new desire, conscious effort, development through
use. The very ohviously insupportable elements of
desire and conscious effort (insupportable as applying
to the lower forms of life) are not essential to the
theory. The pivot upon which the validity of Lamarck ^s
explanation turns is the implied inheritance of acquired
chaxac te ri s ti c s •
Later critical analysis and experimentation has
discredited Lamarckianism as an explanation of evolu-
tion as a whole. Particularly, Weismann»s now generally
accepted germ plasm theory, which affirms the isolation
of reproductive cells and therefore denies the trans-
mission of acquired characters, is a blow at Lamarck's
theory. There are those, however, vdic "believe that at
least in some of the lower plants and animals some
acquired characteristics may be inherited. Coulter hints
at a possible basis of truth in Lamarckianism even as
applied to the higher stages of evolution: In our
higher plants and animals, v/e have reason to believe
that the inheritance of acquired characters cam take
place, at best, only under very special circumstances,
circumstances \i^ich are capable of exercising a very
1
profoimd influence upon the organism without killing it.**
Granted the complete differentiation of germ plasm
Of. cut-
1 Coulter^ p» 74
A
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from "body tissue, the question yet arises: Since the
germ cells axe at least adjacent to the somatic cells,
cannot environment yet propose conditions to surround
the germ cells, which will control dominance or
recessiveness of unit characters so as to change the
general character of the organism produced? It seems
at least that the health of somatic cells may influence
the health of the germ cells* May there not be further
influence than this?
There is yet another angle of approach to the
question. Be Vries* mutations are admitted to "be often
in the direction of adaptation and most numerous in
particular kinds of environment. Until further investi-
gation we cannot afford to be dogmatic in the matter.
We may say, however, that the Lamarckian theory may
have played a large part in the more primitive stsiges
of evolution, but that probably it plays a relatively
small part in the evolution of the higher forms*
Charles Darwin (1809-1882) has had so definite and
permanent an influence upon evolutionary theory that
to him is often popularly attributed the origination
of the doctrine. Coulter enumerates his three special
contributions to biological science: (1) He, more than
any predecessor, developed the scientific method of
I.
r
(
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o"bservation and inference. For twenty years before
he published his results he had been traveling
extensively, delving into every available source of
natural history, and carefully analyzing the datg.
thus obtained* (2) He was the first to carry the evolu-
tion idea before the general jjublic and to popularize
it; not so much directly as through his followers vdio
were popular lecturers; not because he aimed to declare
a popular message but because the way had been prepared
by others and the psychological moment had arrived
for the awakening of public interest in evolution*
(3) He formulated his theory of Natural Selection,
vdiich has thus far stood the tests of criticism, not
as the explanation of evolution but as a description
of an essential aspect of the process*
Darwin •s attention was arrested by the facts of
geometric ratio of increase, death, and the equilibrium
of species. A struggle for existence seemed to him
to be the primary movement or organic life, and this
was to him a clew to evolutionary explanation. He
believed the principles underlying the production of
new forms of life to be (1) Variation, (2) a struggle,
chiefly within species, for existence, the survival of
f I
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the fittest by natural selection, and the inheritance
of organic character. "The average fitness (adaptation
to environment) of the next generation is the same
as that of the parents, but some few of the progeny are
1
even more fit than were the parents*" In the struggle
to exist, these more fit ones survive sind produce in
their turn progeny which averages on a grade with
themselves, but which includes some individuals more
fit than the average. These again tend to be selected
for survival, and thus the process continues.
Darwin's hypothesis is borne out to a certain
extent by experimentation- In the case of domestic
plaints and animals, man at first unconsciously used
artificial selection, tending to preserve those indi-
vidusils best adapted to his own needs. This naive
control and later scientific developments in control
have produced more rapid results in the evolution of
varieties within species. But it has not in itself
transcended the boundaries between species.
The stress in Darwinism is upon the preservation
of liie fit, but it does not give an adequate account
of the arrivail of the fit. Y^ithout a doubt, Darwinian
theory is a partial account of evolution. To this
extent it behooves us to consider its significance
1 Coulter: Where Evolution and Religion Meet.. p. 39
C i
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for human conduct. In the state of civilization,
Coulter says, it is intelligence, energy, health,
the sense of Justice, which best adapt the human
organism for survival. '»lShen society is so con-
ducted as to give all individuals a fair opportunity
to express those desirable traits with which they may
be endowed,^ the greatest progress in human selec-
1
tion will result**
We said a moment a,go that neither Darwin's
natural selection nor artificial selection seeci to
have been able to transcend the boundaries between
species. It was Hugo Be Vries (born in Haarlem,
Holland, 1848, Professor of Botany in Amsterdam
University) vdio supplemented Darwin's theory with
that of '•mutations'*. In his "pedigree culture", he
had worked for thirteen years with the primrose,
and discovered among his plants an occasional new kind
of individual, a sport, or "mutant" as he called it^
^ich seemed to be a mere chance occurrence. These
mutations were not necessarily adaptive, and, he said,
they v/ere unpredictable. They might happen to be
useful, useless, or even harmful. From these data he
developed his "mutations theoiy" of evolution.
The question arises (aa has previously been hinted)
1 Coulter, op. cit» p. 39
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as to yfcether such mutations are \diolly unaccountable,
chance formations, or whether there may "be some undis-
covered law in accordance vfiiiL which they appear. That
is to say, perhaps there are overlooked factors in the
combination from v^ich they emerge. Reason, at all
events, is not satisfied with the offering of a deistic
interference with the orderly progress of events, as
explanation, neither can reason rest in mere chance.
The fact remains that De Vries has made a valuable
contribution to evolutionary theory. The fact of
mutations cannot be denied; and they are a very satis-
factory and demonstrable descriptive explanation of the
passage over the boundary line from species to species,
in "the evolutionary series. De Vriesianism gathers to
itself the principles of Darwinism and in addition
provides for qualitative as v/ell as quajititative
variatiqn, thus avoiding Darwin s limitation*
The social and ethical significajice of the theory
needs interpr6^tion. Obviously, to promote the progress
of the race, the rec ccmiendations of De Vriesianism are
that reproduction of well adapted mutants be encouraged,
that the expression of desirable traits be permitted,
and that the reproduction of seriously defective mutants
be made possible. Again we quote Coulter: "Either under
an intelligent democracy or a benevolent autocracy.
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superior individuals have the right of opportimity
for self expression and propagation. The right economic
situation is one which makes it readily possible for
any really capable individual to attain a comfortable
though not extravagant and luxurious standard of living.
The right educational system is one that puts a higher
education within the reach of every individual who gives
1
good evidence of his ability.* The difficulty, of
course, is in applying Ihese recommendations*
There have been observed from time to time some
very marked tendencies toward variation along what
seem to be definitely predetermined lines. There have
been noted certain variations Tsdthin species, and
generations later, variations in the same direction have
taken place among the progeny of the original mutants.
An obvious case of this is the Boston fern, which
originally had a simply compound leaf. Later there
were mutations of doubly compound leaves; then in
individuals of a later generation triply compound leaves
appeared; and sti luiater came quadruply compound leaves*
The attempt to account for this phenomenon by referring
it to sua internal force ?hich operates independently
of environmental influence, is called the •orthogenetic
1 Coulter, op. cit., p. 54
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theory*. It succeeds, however, merely in naming a
problem rather than in presenting a solution.
Another subsidiary principle, one which has some
value in the explanation of some particular cases,
is offered in the "isolation theory". This may pre-
suppose either the ••mutaticns" of De Vries ot the
"modifications" of Lamarck. Ordinarily, with the
free intercrossing between the modified and unmodified
or between mutant and normal, within a large group,
peculiar characters tend to be lost in the v^iole, a
general average within the group thus being maintained*
But lihen a small group becomes isolated from the larger
group, the situation may be different. The modified
individuals may approach the unmodified in number*
Then the Tiiiole group becomes modified in the same pro-
per ti on.
Perhaps the population then consists of "half-
modified" individiials. If the isolation continues,
this original change will make opportunity for other
chsmges, and in time a new species may result. This
theory would be a partial explajiation of the difference
in national character between the British nation and
the early American. It explains the multiplication of
species on a given level, but takes no account of pro-
c
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gressive adaptation. Says Coulter: "Choose one of
•these 'classic' theories to explain progression or
adaptative evolution, the production of the more
advanced organisms from the more primitive, and then
let the isolation theory explain 'lateral* evolution.
•
The social ideal for human evolution recommends
the growth of unity, mutual understanding, brother-
hood, and iTOuld therefore oppose further isolation
and the mere multiplication of species within the human
race*
Yet another subordinate theory is proposed*
Hybridization produces new types of organisms, which
may (1) be intennediate between the differing parents,
(2) be mosaics, showing combinations of parental charac-
ters, or (3) more rarely show new characters, exhibited
by neither parent. Artificial hybridization is a
common fact. Natural crossing is not unevidenced.
It liierefore appears that hybridization plays a real
part in the evolutionary process, its function being
to produce a greater number of varieties for selection,
thus hastening the process of evolution. In this connec-
tion. Coulter says that this is the real function of
sex; T/e would say the biological function. The hybridi-
zation theory could not apply to the more primitive
1 Coulter* op» cit.
, p. 61
cI
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asexual forms of life. The theory is incomplete,
moreover, in that it does not explain the origin cf
the parental differences*
The theory is rather significant in its practical
applications to human evolutionary control* A study
of the prohlem has led to the following generally
accepted conclusions: In hybridization, sometimes
desirable traits combine to produce improved individuals;
sometimes inferior individuals result from the combina-
tion of undesirable traits. The possibilities and
probabilities in combination need to be carefully studied.
Experts tell us that the crossing of the color line in
human breeding is likely to produce unfortunate results,
but that the advantages of less v/ide crosses are» on
the whole, more numerous than the disadvantages*
We have seen, then, that on a biological basis,
tJie most significant factors presented by the various
important evolutionary theories, are mutation, and
natural selection among mutants or variants. We have
seen, too, that there is stilljroom for the accrediting
of certain elements of Lamarckianism. As subordinate
principles, isolation enters into the process to
multiply varieties on the same level, though not to
initiate progress nor adaptation; and hybridization.
c1
I
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on the other hand, does account to some extent for
progress after mutations are already presents
In at least two respects, however, cur explanation
is stillJincomplete. First, aji important and scientific-
ally demonstrable factor in the evolutionary process
has not yet been recognized: the social-psychological
factor. Secondly, description is not full explajiation
Tishere direction is indicated. Full explanation will
involve philosophical interpretation with reference
to the category of causality. We must think not only
in terms of the survival of Ihat ^ich appears in the
series, but also in terms of the ultimate explanation
of the series itself*
C. The Rise of Intelligence.
Let us look into Ihe matter of the so far neglected
factor: that of social heredity and the psych ologicali
element in it.
Herbert William Conn says in the preface of his
book, "While the human animal may doubtless have been
developed under the laws which have brought about the
evolution of the animal world, the humain social unit
has been developed under the influence of a new set
< I
1
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of forces ushich. have had little or no influence in
1
developing the animal kingdom." "Whereas every other
animal may be regarded simply as an incident in an
evolutionary process, — mankind is taking possession--
2
chajiging the whole face of nature."
Conn eniomerates the following fundamental differ-
ences between man and animals: (1) man's power of
fonning concepts and using words, (2) the possession
by man of a moral sense, and (3) the fact that man
alone develops socie!i<ties and government. It is possibl
to taJce a measure of exception to all three of these
statements of difference, in that the rudiments of
each may possibly be found in liie lower animaJL world.
Kcehler's experiments with apes have most certainly
disclosed surprising powers of reasoning viiich banish
some of "the nice lines of demarcation which we are
accustomed to draw between the human and the subhuman.
Even a very crude attempt at communication by means of
specialized sounds exists among some animals. A
rudiment of liie moral sense, many claim, is found
among animals in the apparent desire for social
approval; and some of us Yicio are acquainted with some
of 1he higher types of animals are prone to claim even
more for them in the light of seemingly unquestionable
1 Conn: Social Heredity and Social Evolution, pp. v.vi
2 Ibid., p* 8
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acts of heroism. One might say also that the founda-
tions for a moral sense are present in affect and in
the value, for instance, Ti^ich a dog places upon a
bone or upon "being with his master. Again, the rudi-
ments of societies and government are found, on an
instinctive hasis, it is true, among various species.
Though there axe these points of similarity,
and though the rise of man*s peculiar powers may he
traced to lower levels, yet the fact remains that the
differences of degree are so great as to "become
differences of kind. It is impossible at dawn to
designate the moment T«hen night becomes day; never-
theless tJiere are fundamental differences in kind
between day and night and differences of function as
well. Our point is, that TB^ether or not we can establish
a definite moment at which human consciousness and
social heredity becomes a factor in evolution, the
fact remains that such a factor exists and must be
reckoned with.
If we place no value for the moment upon the
psychological, from the point of view of power over
environment, main an animal is inferior; but as a
social unit he is infinitely superior to all the rest
of his environment. We quote again from Conn:
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"After all, it is ciyiliaation that makes the man,
and not his hones, muscles, nor even his mental attri-
butes. Of course, intelligence is a fundamental
factor, since without it civilization could not have
been developed. But it is really the powers that come
from society that put man upon a plane so much above
1
animals." This fact can be demonstrated by comparing
an exceptionally intelligent savage with a civilized
leader. Certainly, because of ihe incomparably
greater resources at his command, the latter can msLke
an immeasurably greater impression upon future genera-
tions*
Though Lamarck's biological inheritance of
acquired characters has been practically banished or
at least minimized to negligibility by Weismaxinism,
we have, then, discovered a principle by n^ich, after
a certain stage has been reached, such acquired charac-
ters as language, writing andjprinting, the moral sense,
customs and government( the willingness to be governed)
and the accumulation of material wealth, of information,
and even of ideas and standards, may be transmitted
from one generation to another in such a way as to
direct the course of evolution.
The teachability of humankind makes possible the
1 Conn: op. cit., p. 18
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control of social heredity "by education. There are
certain 'actions of liie preformed "brain" (Conn), ndiich
we call instincts. But experience modifies even the
orgsinic structure; and education is the control of
experience in such a way as to modify organic structure
along chosen lines; or, to use a modern phrase, education
is the sublimation of instinct or the transformation of
inherited responses. Our psychological method will
determine how- -whether by conditioning- -a la Y/atson--
by catharsis—^a la Hall— by Freudian methods, or by a
more psychological approach--idealization.
Psychology does present the crux of the problem
and significance of evolution; and our psychological
theory is bound to determine both Ihe aim and the method
of control, or indeed, 7,iiether we shall make any effort
to control the direction of evolution.
Extreme skeptics, like Watson, can consistently
have no interest in evolution. Indeed, there can be
for them no progressive evolution in any real sense,
for progress implies rationality and rationality implies
free agency*
(Parenthesis
:
The question often does arise: Are we more than
instinctive creatures tending by organic adjustment to
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satisfy primary instincts? We often supply the skeptic
with tinder for his fire. Much of our activity, ultra-
refined though it may be, does seem to originate here.
It is only "by genuine altruism that we can refute his
argument effectively. It should, however, "be "borne in
mind here, that the refined product, the 'sublimted
instinct**, is^ not the original instinct but a totally
new thing. A thing is to be judged not by its origin
but by its values in and for itself*)
Not only may acquired characters be transiaitted to
offspring by social heredity, but such inheritance is
mucti more dependable and also morejcontrollable liian
organic inheritance; and therefore in race improvement,
the significance of social heredity or environment is
greatly enhanced. "Man has created f oifhimself a irfiolly
new series of laws and forces -w^Lich, in large measure,
1
nullify the older laws of heredity.*
Conn goes on to show how the three fundamental
differences between man and the lower animals which he
has mentioned are built out of social experience upon the
struggle for the life of the species, and the primitive
simple, original nature of man; as, for example, the moral
sense upon the social instincts. Of course, these latter
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originate sis biological mutations. Conn explains these
mutations by saying liiat the "nature of man is such "ftiat
variations along the line of altruism are constantly
appeaxing*** This touches upon the philosophy of evolution,
or the dynamics back of the thing. It suggests the
creative theory of evolution, or, possibly, the theory of
emergence, both of ?iiich we shall touch upon a little later.
The development of civilization, according to Conn,
is the result of a constsint struggle between the opposing
forces of centralization and individualism, a conflict
1
between the egoistic and tiie altruistic instincts.
"The triumph of individualism would have been barbarism;
the triumph of centralization would have been stagnation;
2
the contest of the two has produced civilization.*
It should be remembered that the instincts emerge
into consciousness. The conflict between them results in
the development of mesmings and the transformation or the
sublimation of instinct. And so civilization develops.
To show further ajid briefly the significance of
social heredity we continue to quote Conn:
^Wcien a single Daphnia may have millions of offspring
during the few weeks of summer, it matters not in the
1 Conn: op. cit., pp. 179,222
2 Ibid.
, p. 195
I I
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evolution of the race Aether any particular individual
1
survive or perish**
•If any ajiimal should develop some mutation of extreme
value to his race, but should "by accident be prevented from
leaving any offspring, his influence upon the race would
absolutely vanish and the race be left exactly as if he
2
had not been born." The case is quite otherwise with man*
"Social heredity, by furnishing the exceptional indi-
vidual with almost unlimited powers, has thus called into
existence perhaps the most mighty force that has contributed
3
to "tile evolution of the social organism."
The significajice of social heredity as a factor in
evolution is tremendous for education. It lays emphasis
upon the educational process as the most effective means of
improving the race, it magnifies the influence of the indi-
vidual, through his psychological contribution to society.
It places the key to the future in our own hands.
In view of the philosophical interpretation of evolution
which we are about to undertake, axid our coming discussion of
the doctrine of levels, perhaps the most significant conclusion
of Conn's is this: Man "must be looked upon as more thaJi
an incident. • .\«ftien judged by flesh and bone, man is certainly
a primate, but -vdien judged by achievement, he cannot be classed
1 Connriop. cit., p. 313
2 Ibid p. 314
3 ibid. p. 316

1
with animals at all»*
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D. Philosophical Interpretations of
Evolution.
We have already indicated that evolutionary explana-
tion is incomplete with mere description, and that philo-
sophical interpretation is significant for our understanding
of evolution as a principle of moral and religious education.
We have said that tie theories thus far propounded fail to
explain mutations or •the arrival of the fittest". We have
hinted, however, tiiat mutations might prove to he predictable
if we knew enough facts, that sometime we might "be able to
classify them as orderly phenomena of nature. But even
then, is the^arrival of the fittest" explained^ Coulter says,
*Any explanation of evolution must be based on some change or
variation that appears in an individual organism, something
Tighich makes it different from the other individuals of the
same species. Unless we have such a change to begin with,
1
it is impossible to devise any scheme to explain evolution.*
Biologoical and social heredity describe the sequences
and forms of the process, but they do not reveal the dynamic
of the movements
The great philosophical questions which have grown out
of "the scientific study of evolution have revolved around the
1 Conn: op. cit.
, pp. 202, 203
1 Coulter: op. cit., p. 69
t
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concepts of causality and teleology; mechanism, emergence,
and creation, determinism and freedom.
We diall pass very rapidly over all the current
philosophical theories of evolution except the two which
appear to "be of most significance for our present purposes;
emergence and psychotropism»
We pass over the crass view that in the beginning God
created the earth and the inhabitants thereof about as they
are now, and that either he endowed them with a kind
of power or entelechy{merely a nsime doing duty for the
solution of a problem), which provides for reproduction
with slight variations, or else that all vdiich has
"evolved" v/as present, preformed, in miniature within
the first creation. "In Adam all sinned."
The naivet^ of such views forbids our pausing,
except to say that the more sopMsticated modern creative
theories of evolution \daich propose an elan vital or
entelechy to explain direction and order in evolution
are subject to the same criticism: they merely provide
names for a problem rather than a finaJ explanation, ij'or
Bergson's and Driesch's teleological principle is not
an Agent vAiose activities take the form of the evolutionary
series itself, but rather an extraneous something, a
quasi-psychological argent vhich enters the biological
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series, at all points, perhaps i but nevertheless in
dualistic fashion, etriiggling against the materialistic
biological. Creative evolution, then, while it might
supply an explanation of variation and direction, is
nevertheless untenable because it establishes no point
of contact between the series and the teleological
principle*
Very populajr is the theory of pure mechanism
which posits basic chemical realities in chance combina-
tions. But such a theory destroys reason. It simply
says there is no reason f or the favorable combinations
Tiidiich have taken place out of an infinite number of
possible combinations. At least we say that such chance
is very remarkable. Our problem centers around the
philosophy of chance and probability and is intimately
associated with the validity of the coherence criterion
of truth. We are faced with the dilemma of accepting
a miracle (the inexplicable), rather, multitudinous
miracles, or, on the ot^iier hand, of positing some
teleological principle* The chances seem vastly in
favor of the latter choice— the probability is over-
whelmingly in the direction of teleology. Our argument
indicates probability instead of presenting mathematical
5 ^
demonstration. Truth revealed by this process is
relative, subject to revision; yet, viiy deny the
larger, more important facts of experience for the
sake of precision? Will not analysis plus experiment
plus rationalism plus synopsis yield truer results
than analysis, experiment, and rationalism of limited
facts alone?
I am Bware tliat ^at has been said here is liable
to the criticism -vdiich has been used against the famous
argument from the mtch* Ve are told that when we find
meaning and teleology in the evolutionary process, we
are like the archeologist vdio, digging up an urn and
finding in it a number of irregularly shaped blocks
of stone TJihich fitted together perfectly to form a
large block, Tsas amazed at the care with which some
one had carefully carved out separately and placed the
blocks in the urn; niien in reality the^fjS were originally
one block, later broken by accident or the action of
heat.
The illustration, however, is not a parallel. Not
only do the parts in the evolutionary process fit
together in a mechanical fashion; but they seem to have
meaning in themselves; and their relationship, more
obviously on the higher levels, is of an intelligible.
c
dynainic nature. If the blocks in tlie urn had not
only fitted together but had had intricate orderly
or rational patterns, or if they had conveyed
decipherable meanings, the archeologist would have
been Justified in inferring teleology.
^en the materialist, for instance, says, that
orgajiic life comes to be of such nature as to utilize
the gases Tshich we find necessary to life on this
planet because it has crept into existence under these
conditions, we raise the question: Does he mean that
life evolves out of matter already in existence on
the planet? This would imply teleology. Or does he
mean that •life'* is scmething other than matter \?hich
"creeps into existence* wherever it can? The "life*
would be a teleological principle.
Even if scientists should succeed in bringing
about a ciiemicsd combination the emergent form of ?diich
was organic, such msuiufacture of life would have
resulted from thejpiirpose of a human being. If there
is no dynamic, no l£over, how can there be movement,
new combinations—evolution? The concept of agency
is necessary to reason. To save reason, to save science
itself we must revert to the concept of teleology*
c
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If it be true that there is nothing new under
the sun, if indeed there is no room for creativity,
for freedom, for value and purpose, then indeed,
"Vanity of vanities, all is vanityi" Everything,
including the validity of all or any of our interpreta-
tions of evolution hinges upon this question. We
are lost in absolute skepticism viaich is nothing but
chaos and irrationality. To accept the opposite view
may be to make a venture of faith, but such faith is
not irrational—indeed, it is the only salvation of
rationality. The assumption that the facts of exper-
ience are all rational is the very foundation of
science. Huxley said, "As for tiie strong conviction
that the cosmic order is rational, and the faith that,
throughout all duration, an unbroken ordei|ias reigned
in the universe, I not only accept but I aan disposed
to think it the most important of all truths." Just so*
Intelligibility implies intelligence.
We may approach the problem of chance mechanism
from anotherangle. If we make the physical world to
be more than phenomenal, that is, to be ontological,
then we have an infinite regress, an attempt to explain
a given arrangement of elements by a preceding arrange-
ment; or else we have an infinite divisibility offered
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as explanation: at cms, electrons, vdiat then?
There are two apparently possible interpretations
of the emergence theory:
(1) as an elaboration of the chance mechanism
theory, seeming to provide by its doctrine of levels
for a measure of novelty after original complexity is
granted. As such we have already disposed of it*
(2) Or, we may give it a free interpretation 'which
recognizes its incompleteness, sees in it a partial
and phenomenal (vs. ontological) accountof evolution,
and finds it valuable as a wholesome protest against
deism in creative evolution and a ciieck against possible
deistic tendencies in psychotropic evolution*
Tlie former interpretation, -jiiiich seems implied in
the statement that "in Morgan's theory God is an after-
thought", does violence to Morgan's position, for, as
he indicates, his theory merely describes;^ rational
sequences and it demands for Causality or dynamic, a
psychological initiative vhich brings about the new
combination, -flhich launches out in ttie direction of
the new. His distinction between causation and Causality
seems to me perfectly sound. The very idea of integra-
tion, 'jAiich is present if the doctrine of levels has
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neaning, necessitates God, if by integration we mean,
as we do, anything creative, rational, intelligible.
If the iiniverse is integrated, there must be a con-
scious focus, an Agent of integration.
Emergence, to be a valid explanation of evolutionary
progress, must be so conceived as to allow the novel
in tile series. For like combinations of like unite
must always result in like products. We have no diffi-
culty in considering present generations of species,
for variety already exists and there are no exactly
like units in exactly like combinations. Combinations
always present novelty in the resultant organic whole,
and possible combinations are on Ihe geometrical
increase. If hybridization were a universally appli-
cable explanation, then emergence would have no diff i-
culty* But such is not the case.
We arrive at a dilemma. Either the series ori-
ginated in complexity, or else novelty is introduced
into the series; or both may be true. Eiliier horn
calls for explanation outside the series. The intro-
duction of novelty--a first variation--into the series
demands either a deistic or an immanent creation along
the line in the beginning s tages. Origin in complexity
presents the alternatives of chance combinations or^
cc
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teleology—intelligent selection and combination.
Qaergence as a scientific theory of evolution
seems to me sound even if incaciplete--just ane aspect
of the process. But as metaphysics Morgan* s thecry
has in it elements of unsoundness. Suppose that
instead of regarding Morgan's theory as dualistic,
we lay emphasis upon emergent sequences as the orderly
activity of an Agent, progressing according to an
intelligent purpose--an activity never deviating
from its orderly (law-abiding) course, and yet freely
directed by purpose because the Purposer not only cont-
inues to act but also has so organized His Universe
that higher laws can modify the direction of lower
law (a commonplace fact), and because the ultimate
law is that of value-making and c onservation , in persons.
Integral in Morgan's theory is the dependence of the
lower upon Ihe higher.
Although we cannot accept scne of the Spinoza-
like implications of Morgan's metaphysical statement,
his confession of faith inGod, "on -ydiom all things
depend" suggests an arresting thought. Usin^is
pktrase a bit differently from his intent, we conclude
that vdien "deity", or as we should prefer to say»
divinity, or God-likeness, in man, "emerges", then
+ V
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for the first time God expresses Himself freely through
His universe* The self -limitations involved in creation
are no longer a hindrance. *Ye are the "body of Christ*-
not in a pantheistic sense, "but in 1iie sense of a har-
monious integrated complex of complexes*
By this interpretation \re conserve all the values
of the emergence theory and gain a universe in which
Spirit is fundam^entally free, we provide for prayer,
and incidentally for miracles, if such should have
spiritual value*
The helief in God, in our opinion, will always
remain an adventure of faith (not irrational, we
reiterate), compelled "by the highest integration of
experience, "but not a fact scientifically demonstra'ble
until we reach the highest level of science where
it merges with philosophy into religious experience*
God is to he found not in interference, nor in "gaps"
in a series, "but in the great general viewpoint that
seea things whole. "Integration" is the key word that
echoes "creativity"*
Our first objection to "emergence" did not arise
from the impression that God \«as a mere unnecessary
appendage to tlie system, (He seems to us very necessary
for complete explanation); but it arose from the fact
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that, as Morgan left the matter, his theory seemed
not to aJLlOTiT for freedom and purpose within the system,
thus irrationalizing existence hy denying value.
But let us remember that, according to him, not only
do the higher levels 'involve* the lower, but the
lower •depend on' the higher. These two terms,
involution and dependence, axe not to be confused*
Self-consciousness and purposive "thinking may 'involve'
the nervous system, but do not 'depend on' it. The
self may act as a whole even while it is part of a
larger whole; and we see nothing in the system ifiiiich
would deny that the self may initiate, that is,
direct activity, -ysAiich, in turn does indeed involve
the lower levels of the series. Tliis paradox could
not be #iolly true unless freedom and purpose
initiated the -gi^ole process.
Is it not possible to have both determinism and
freedom, both mechanism and purpose. Under the doctrine
of levels, it seems to us, it is possible: to have
determinism from the point of view of origins, and
freedom from the point of view of conscious process.
And even the determinism of origins must fallback
ultimately on purposeful organization of the ifAiole.
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(At tliis point we do not propose to put the cart
"before the horse and define freedom and determinism,
"before we have had an opportunity to discover from
investigation of actual experience its nature and
form. For such a definition, see page 144j>)* Creativity
in finite selves might be regarded both as an
emergence and as a creation, just as any other level
of evolution may be regarded*
If it may be said at all that the Creator ^enters'
the series at any point, or, to put it another way,
if we must show the 'points* at "vidiich direction takes
place, then it is at this point of 'dependence* of
dynamic, 'Ahere the organizing center of the emergent
T/diole dominates the parts. This is #iere we synthesize
emergence smd psychotropism as theories. Tiie emergent
level is new because integrated. Integration is a
psychological process*-
Carrying the axiom of oi^anic vdaoles stillfurther
we can conceive God as liie conscious Center of organiza
tion of the universal whole; and human selves as sub-
sidiary conscious organizing centers, involving lowgr;
levels of existence because they appear at their partie
sUlar points in the process. If activity on ajiy of
the lower levels necessitates readjustment of the vrtiole
I
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must not any activity on the purposive, creative
level, such as prayer, result in readjustment of
the T?diole on #iich it 'depends'? We are thus not
only "making room" for some kind of divine response
to prayer, but making it necessary if liie universe
is rational, that is, if the intelligent, purposive
Actor or Organizer, of \7hom the universe is the
active expression, is s elf -consistent*
And accepting the idea that the c onsciousness
of God(oTDj ective genitive) emerges (is the product
of social experience acted upon by conscious processes)
and simultaneously insisting that such 'emergence*
involves a conscious weighing of values- -judgment
ajid choice* after such plane of evolution has been
reached, we see nothing against assuming that there
may be immediate apprehensions, immediate insights,
of an emotional nature based upon previous rational,
emotional, and volitional processes and by virtue of
the infinite involvement of truth. Thus, with an
immanent God, both mystical and rational religious
experiences are stimulated by Him in about the same
way. It may be the imagination Tshich presents God to
the mystics, as even most self-psychologists would
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tell us, "but even aji emergent imagination is an
expression of His creative activity. So» after all,
it is Himself miio is apprehended*
We create God for ourselves. We do, indeed.
That is, we create our concept of Him* But vie do
so "because from the "beginning He has so ordained--
because He created us with the tendency (not a
particular or definite instinct "but the capacity,
even the ultimate tendency, of the whole) to achieve
a knowledge of Him* T^e are directly stimulated by
Him and from the materials He supplies in our experience
of His activity* and in the integration of our experience
we arrive at our knowledge of Him. This knowledge, then,
is both subjective and objective*
"God is law say the wise: 0 Soul, and let us rejoice,
For if He thunder by law, the thunder is yet
His voice.*
-- Tennyson
"What we are saying is that the evolutionary series
may be orderly, sven necessary, if we assime rationality
as its dynamic, tiiat self -consciousness may arise as
an emergent in the evolutionary series, that even the
backgrounds of personal choices may be externally
determined, except in so far as previous choices have
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entered into it; tut that by its very nature, the
self » acting as a whole, dominates "the lower levels.
Even though the self acts along lines indicated by
experience, and so, in a sense, determined, yet it
acts freely in the sense that it has organized that
experience, that it acts as a #iole in utilizing the
background of experience, and that the direct determina-
tion is in terms of meanings*
So far as values are concerned, then, and so far
as our choices are experienced as our own, from our
own point of view, our choices arefree. Only so c an
there be real pers onal values- -as we learn to appreciate
by the experience of achievement. But the question is
not yet closed in the present writer's mind vidiether
this choice is incompatible with the reign of law even
in selfhood. After the achievement of the highest values
has been made, may not the ultimate underlying purposeful
reign of law be revealed as a series of anergences
culminating in God-like character'? It will thus be
God and man in co-operation, that achieve the goal of
individual self-realization. From man's point of view*
the God-phas4— that which is "given* in experience— is
determining; and yet also man is conscious of being
the free selective agent viio focuses a ttention upon
ct i
I
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certain ends and so wills to act--or not to act*
% Thus determinism and freedom, so far from being con-
tradictory, are "but the two aspects of one process.
The present writer is 9, "bred-in-the-bone follower
of \7esley, a predetermined Arminian, as it were;
but she confesses that this study is leading her into
the rank heresy of Calvinisml And yet she is both
Arminian and Calvinist, for this is her stand: We
must admit determinism from the point of Yie.v of
origins within the evolutionary process; at the same,
time, even in the present stage of human evolution,
we may grant that within the thou^t process itself there
is a point at which the tables are turned— there is a
modicum of freedom.
Though the self emerges, yet at times it acts
as a whole in selecting the content of consciousness,
T3reaks the equilibrium in the weighing of possible
alternatives of action, and so determines its own
future character. If this is true now, is the
evolutionary tendency not also toward tiae increase of
this freedom; and is Mathews not justified in his
intimations of immortality?
Psychotropism, then, seems to me to be not con-
tradictory but supplementary, to "emergence" as
*1
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above interpreted. The emphasis of Dr. Mathews taJtes
into account further and bigh*''*^aspects of the evolutionary
process, adds the value of inmiortality, and so itself
serves to enlarge our grasp and interpretation of
evolution*
According to Mathews, if we may venture to inter-
pret him in terms of the concept of emergence, each
emergent level in "the direct line (i»e*, every emergent
organism which tends to survive and reproduce itself
and 30 determine the line of evolution) is distinguished
from its predecessors "by a superior adaptation to
environment. The direction of evolution is toward
increasing the dondiiance of the organism over physical
environment and points toward independence.
It is possible to conceive such independence only
in terms of conscious process, and that only if we
accept the axiom formerly alluded to: that the T«^ole
explains the parts and not the parts the whole. If
we find unity (as well as causality) in selfhood
rather "than in the atom, then we arrive at an explanation
of evolution which makes it intelligible (vs. the
chaos of chance) and we may think of Ihe \ihole process
of evolution as the activity of an intelligent Agent*
I
progressing from simplicity to complexity, moving
with purpose from nothingness through the levels of
the inorganic, the organic, the conscious, the self-
conscious, to the immortals
Emergence as a liieory of evolutionjlvould insist
that it is the movement itself^ and not mere isolated
steps in the movement, which is to Tae explained
teleologically. It is the dynamic which accomplishes
the end; the activity which ia the process and gives it
meaning, rather than a counter-activity, an interference,
#iich is to be explained by positing God.
The contribution of Mathewsian psychotropism
is to point even more definitely to the rational,
psychical nature of evolution; to discover the meaning
in all parts of the process, by reference to the end.
•^Not only in the cataract and the thunder
Or in the deeps of man's uncharted soul,
Bht in the dew- star dwells the wonder
And in iiie viiirling dust mite the control*
- Roberts
It lays emphasis vdiere Morgan fails to do so, asserts
principles which he perhaps never intended, and yet
which are implied at least in my own interpretation
of "emergence", and adds 1iie insight into immortality
1
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as the goal of evolution.
Mathews points out, in his theory, that unlike
the blocks in the urn earlier referred to, the
relation of adaptation is rational and dynamic; that
organisms have rational relations within themselves
ajid that the issue of evolution is the consciousness
of meanings and the increasingly ffree selection of
values. He calls attention to the outstanding facts
v^ich justify the inference of teleology, yet without
making Purpose and Intelligence extraneous to the
v^ole process. The difference here between his theory
and that of emergence is one of emphasis in the former
upon that which is merely implied in the latter, and
the difference culminates in the announcement of the
hope of immortality. Mathews looks in the direction
indicated by evolution, realizes that it is necessarily
purposive, takes the cue, makes the leap of faith which
seems most consistent, and sings with Tennyson:
"Many an Aeon moulded earth before her highest, man,
was born.
Many an Aeon, too may pass when earth is manless and
forlorn,
3arth so huge, and yet so bounded
—
pools of salt and
plots of land--
Shallow skin of green and azure--chains of mountains,
grains of sand
I
Only that which made us, meant us to b e mightier by
and by.
Set the sphere of all the boundless Heavens within the
human ey^jj^
Sent the shadow of Himself, the boundless, thro* the
huraaji soul;
Boundless inward, in the at an, boundless outward in
the Whole ^"
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In making this venture of faith IJathews is but moving
with all who live (for living constantly involves faith)
including ainjscientists . The assumption of any meaning
is a leap of faith. Intelligibility implies Intelligence
in action.
Thus it is that Morgan and Mathews have supplied
the "missing think" (Marlatt) \vhich is complementary
to the scientific theories. It is not that a gap has
been filled ifihere the differences between antecedent
forms and immediate derivatives were too great for
scientific rest of mindi but rather that the dynamic
has been discovered \*Lich makes possible any movement
at all»
Mathews makes the essence of life a capacity for
struggling against environment, and such a capacity
is psychical. "It is in reality man*s struggle with
tlie environment which carries him alv;ays to a larger
life. Just in proportion as he succeeds and struggles
he wins his freedom; he becomes a man> ijiiose spirit
1
cannot be daunted." "And in proportion as, objectively,
environmental freedom has been obtained, subjectively,
self-consciousness has arisen. It is only vdien a man
is completely free that he may say the universe consists
1 Mathews: The Road of Evolution, p, 352
•
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1
of two things, himself and all else.*
E. Synopsis*
The significance of these conclusions is, of
course, tremendous- -all in all. Shall we suimnarize?
1. The physical basis of eYolution is achieved
"by the teleological facts of variation and natural
selection, resulting in the survival of the fittest*
2» 'ffe cannot count upon control of evolutionary
results "by the transmission of acquired characters
through biological inheritance.
3* The most potent factor in the higher stages
of evolution is social heredity*
4. The instrument of control through social
heredity is education.
5. Since the dynamic of evolutionary progress is
purpose, psychological, and since evolution itself has
been defined as 'the spirit trying to throw off the
trammels of matter*, the educational method suggested
is the development of constructive psychoses,, control
by ideals*
•'^Zhat is of great importance is that the new
departures or variations which emerge in fine children
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should be fostered, not nipped in the bud, by the
1
social environment, education included."
Methods, however, are hardly of interest, unless
we have a goal in view. Thomson indicates as the
evolutionary prospect for man: a body structure not
greatly changed, though with some improvement such as
a decrease in the length of the food canal and less
crowding of teeth; constitutional changes, such as
prolonged youthfulness, a higher standard of healthful-
ness, greater resistajice to disease; im:jrovements in
€ >
intelligence and control* It i s in the latter that
our primary interest lies, for it is our '^open , sesame'*.
The physical changes vrill be taken care of pretty well
by Darvrin, but tlrie control is ours to seek.
First of all, it is profitable to lealize that there
is a goal, to recognize, as Thomson says, the two facts
of lowliness and greatness. The principle of t volution,
rightly understood, saves frcmjthe »passe» and the
*laissez faire*. It illuminates and invigorates with
inspiration and hope-^the hope of enriched, increasingly
complex self-realization. The direction pointed is
toward more meaningful individuality, toward the persistence
1 Thomson: Outline Of Science, p» 186
li Thomson: ibid. p. 186
(
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of interacting personalities rather thsLn absorption
into a God ^o is an eternal Zero* The Personality
of God Himself is enriched by such complexity,
such interacting finite centers of consciousness*
The "thoughts of God flung out" into partial-
independence, are fruitful ajid multiply, and then as
they are integrated into the divine Whole, yet main-
taining their uniqueness, the integrating, conscious
Center finds His own social nature fulfilled..

THE PRINCIPLE OF PERSONALITY BUILDING.
— IDEALS.
I
5 8.
A* Statement of tiie Problem and Method.
In the previous chapter we have indicated that
the process of evolution points toward the achievement
of personality in terms of social values as the goal
of evolution. We have also indicated that the emergence
in the hioman race of intelligent control of environment
and of infinitely increased educahility presents the
problem of method aind aim in education. What primary
principle shall direct our educational program toward
the achievement of the evolutionary goal?
Our question is a strategic one. Upon its answer
will depend not only the principles of the educational
system v/e build, but the rationale of its very existence.
The very attempt to educate assumes function, and
function can only be made rationail in terms of purposes
sind values. The State assumes a socializing function
when it undertakes to support and direct the process
of education. The Church assumes a spiritualizing
function when it enters the educational field. If
education has not an ethical purpose, then, in the
name of consistency, ^y educate at all? For either
the process is an illusion, or it will take care of
itself, or else purpose and values enter in sind the
1
latter axe assumed to "be oTdJ active. At least, if we
claim to be unbelievers, we practice an 'als ob»
philosophy. Practical life gives the lie to the
mechanical as ccanplete in itself.
The question of tlie possibility of the functioning
of ideals is at present the center of controversy
among educators, the focal point of educational forces^
and when Ihe equilibrium is broken, as it is already
beginning to be, the future educational policy of our
nation, and perhaps of the world, mil be determined*
The question is* if we asaime with all educators
(whether they admit^ or not; the existence of values,
how are we going to translate these values into
practice? Is there any connection between values,
standards, ideals, and actual experience, in terms of
motor activity'-? Our study will aim to throw light
upon this question*
We do not propose Ihe invalidity of all other
methods. Rather we would make full/Use of Watson's
method of ^conditioning" , of the Freudian principles of
instinctive urges, submerged complexes, and the like,
of any germ of truth that may reside in G. Stanley
Hall's doctrine of catharsis, of all the tentative
*
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methods which are valid on their own levels*
But we are in search of a higher economy. Science
is applicable to every level concerning i^daich we can
secure the data. That allfis orderly is the axiom of
rationality.
Then, of course we need biological and physiolo-
gical psychology; of course we need behaviorism;
but why not study the higher levels as well? We differ
with -the Watsonian group more in philosophy than in
scientific method. Our point of difference is at
the denial or the recognition of levels and wholes.
Our own offense is in choosing to carry our scientific
investigation into a field vhich certain others choose
to ignore or to deny, and v\toich still another group,
the sentimentalists of weak faith, would mark with
"hands off" signs* Reverence Is not Incompatible with
clarity of thought*
This attitude is a significsmt one, not only
because it opens closed doors, but because we can
produce evidence to show determination of the lower
levels by the higher as well as determination of the
higher by the lower; and it may vrell be that, while
the educational formulae derived from behavioristic
and related psychologies are perfectly valid in them-
selves* there is possible a higher economy by making
c
61 •
use of the syntheses involved in recognizing the
purely psychic level of any vAiole process viiich
involves all levels* Moreover, a s we have already
suggested in an earlier study of evolutionary theory,
is it not possible that we shall find the most real
reality in the dynamic of the lAiioles rather than in
the mere parts, and that these parts may prove to he
mere modes by Ts^ich we apprehend the psychical
reality? Such a belief seems to us to best account
for the larger facts of experience*
Moreover, even so high an authority as Dr«
Morton Prince says, "--there are not two processes
in the same ofganism, parallel with one another,
but only one process, the conscious process. The
brain process of the physiologist and the electricity
of the physicist, are 1iie modes in indiich the conscious
1
process is ideally apprehended by a second organism.*
. "If consciousness is the reality of neural reflex
processes, then conscious striving and impulse, that
which we call/will and purpose, if apprehended objectively
through the senses v;ould necessarily be apprehended by
r>
these methods as reflex and mechanistic processes. •*
Our treatment, then, will be chiefly psychological,
cur method primarily scientific, but also philosophical
1 Prince: in Murchison, "Psychologies of 1925", td. S18f.
2 Prince: ibid. p. 218f.
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so far as necessary. From this point of view ve
shall endeavor to indicate certain principles v/hich
govern the methods of education in general, and,
specifically, of Christian education. We might have
spread out this presentation of a portion of our
study done in this field and given more attention
to historic backgrounds, to illustrative and func-
tional material, to the details of pedagogical method,
and to an ethical and metaphysical system; "but it
has seemed more profitable to make a fundamental
approach and deal mth a fev/ underlying principles,
leaving most of the practical elaboration for another
occasion*
We make the following propositions regarding
idealization as a principle of education:
a» It is consistent with our theory of evolution
and of psychical dynamic.
b» It is psychologically valid.
Q* It is psychologically economical (1) because it
makes a direct attack in the effort to achieve the
goal indicated by the direction of evolution; (2)
because it indicates Ihe only method of generalizing
responses with regard to varying situations; (3) because
1
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it makes possible the handling of ideas, responses,
and situations in "bundles", and (4) it directly utilizes
the directive power of judgment amd the motive power of
emotion*
d. It is socially economical (1) because habits
merely conditioned may happen to be reconditioned later
and made anti-social, and idealization is therefore more
stable; (2) because the increasing complexity of
social life calls for ideals rather than set standards,
since new and more complicated situations continually
arise for T^ich there can be no possible precedent;
(5) because idealization provides for mastery of environ-
ment rather than conformity to environment.
e» It is already in effective use, and history
presents convincing and abundant v/itness of its power.
f» Christianity presents an ideal inhich is con-
cerned with and provides dynamic for the organization
of the whole of life.
In Ihe ensuing treatmentjof the theme we shall find
it convenient not to follow this exact order, but to
treat some of these points quite elaborately and some
only incidentally in connection with others since their
mere statement above is almost sufficient commendation*
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Theological, metaphysical, and pedagogical considera-
tions, likewise, will take incidental place under the
psychological approach*
B. Idealization as a Principle Seen in
Long-Range Perspective.
Let us then, take a look at idealization as a
principle seen in perspective. In one sense, cur
close look should come first, if in our long-range
view we hope to have a well v/orked out, meaningful
synthesis instead of a mass. The importance of the
scientific approach, of "building theory and phileophy
upon actual data of experience cannot be insisted
upon too strongly, allowing, of course > a proper place
for hypothesis. Hypothesis and unfounded or immutable
assumption are not identical. Nothing is more
despicable either in science or in philosophy than
the subordination of fact to dogma in order to preserve
pet theories. As a matter of fact, it is by a process
of analysis, induction and synthesis, rather than by
a process vhich begins with an assumption and follavs
with deduction and analysis, that we have arrived at the
conclusions here presented. Nevertheless, owing to the
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peculiar status of our theme and in view of popular
philosophical jungle in the v/ay, we feel that a
clearing of the outlying land in this case will
afford a profitable view of the background and will
allow greater freedom in the handling of material and
terms. Therefore we shalljreverse the logical order
and present our synthesis first, proceeding afterward
to clarify it by analysis. It will seem at first
that this chapter has nothing to do with the scientific
validity of idealization as a principle of education,
but perhaps the next chapter will show that it has
everything to do with the question.
In our preceding study of evolution we have
developed a biologicaJL-psychological theory. With the
biological aspect we are not now especially concerned,
except to say that we found the Darwinian, De Vriesian,
Weismannian and certain subordinate theories quite
acceptable and valuable but incomplete as explanation.
Variations and mutations must be explained either by
chance or by teleology. The definite line of develop-
ment in the direction of superior adaptation to
environment and towards the psychological and
consciously purposive suggested the psychical nature of
the whole process. The functional is recognized in
1€
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Bi-olbgy as soon ats explanation is attempted. The
only alternative is blind chance, vhich undermines
all rationality, and is a form of solipsism. We
foiHid our solution in a synthesis of Lloyd Morgan's
"Emergent Evolution* and Professor Albert Mathews*
•Psychotropic Evolution*** We found in "emergence** a
Tfsholesome check against any deistic tendency in the
interpretation of psych otropism, which might base
its belief in God and the psychical upon apparent
gaps in the evolutionary s eries.
We based our final conclusions upon two or three
principles vihich we upheld: (1) that an organic vdiole
is more than the mere sum of its parts, (2) that
therefore one process may have multiple aspects or
••levels" for interpretation, and (3) that 1he purposive,
v^en we are focusing upon the highest level of experience
is the ultimate datum. More specifically, the arrival
of a new form in the evolutionary series may be
partially explained by the combinations which produce
it; that is, the emergent result of the combination is
more than a mere numerical sum of the parts and has
unique characters or arrangements. Again, if we
interpret a single psychological process, this may be
done on one level in terms of physiological activity
T1 1
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(it is soirie\';to.at like the confusl^ing dot figures of the
psychologists)] and -v^en a still)aigher level, that of
consciousness, emerges, we claim for it equal rights
of interpretation. And if vre should show, in our
subsequent study, the existence of still^higher levels
•s^ich are increasingly independent of environment*
we shall claim for them the same rights of inter-
pretation, aAd explanation*
The scientist places his faith in the supposi-
tion liiat all restlity conforms to law, and he even
msikes such conformity his test of truth. If it can
"be sho\7n that all development in that which we call
the "spiritual" realm not only conforms to law, hut
is itself of the very essence of law, ^111 not the
conclusion commend itself to scientists that such
a realm not only is real and to he reckoned with,
tut also can lay claim to a superior kind of reality?
And will not this realm challenge reverent scientific
exploration rather than curled lips or shrugs of the
shoulder, or even the feeble cautions of those whose
faith is weak? We claim the privilege, then, of
investigating the laws of activity on any such higher
levels as vre may find to exist, and of examining
evidences of interdetermination*
t
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In our study of evolution we found that the most
powerful determining principle in the higher stages of
evolution v/as liie factor of conscious control of
environment. In this chapter we shall make a study of
the emergence of this factor in the individual, as in
the evolutionary series, '^e shall see how out of the
physiological structure arises the structure we call
personality and that larger one we call society.
The only principle which offers a clue to explstnation
is the principle of integrati^^n, from the simple con-
figuration of awareness of stimuli and response, to
concepts and finally to that summary or condensation
of experience which takes the form of a value judgment
of 1iie 'iAQiole of experience and has objective reference
both to a responsive Ground of that '\i7hole and to
self-adjustment. Such a value judgment is a whole
which yet seems to be an absolute unit*
The fact of ^oles is a cue to the method as
well as the meaning of life. The fact of #ioles is
our ultimate ground for Ideals.
It provides a key principle for psychological
investigation and for the interpretation of single
processes on a plurality of levels. It is the principle
of integration in both individuals and a universe.
Vi
rii
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C. The Development of Personality.
Valentine, in "The Psychology of Personality",
compares the evolution of personality to the making
of attar of roses: the painstaking care of the
horticulturist in the production of one rose, the
skilled process of the chemist #10 uses 40,000
roses in the making one ounce of attar, or 80 in the
distillation of one drop of the precious fluid:
"from the soil to a final essence". He says, "Personality
is a similar emergence, only a thousand times more
complea.. For it is no single essence. Every separate
aspect of it is an essence drawn from preceding
sources by processes as intricate as those of the
attar» And every separate aspect is interlocked
1
v/ith every other aspect."
The first level with viiich we are concerned in
this study of personality in the making is the
physiological basis. An analysis of chemical activity,
I suppose, would be a more complete treatment but
we can \iell afford to begin with the physiological
•
that
Everyone admits/ to the bar of science as an eligible
datum. The physiological background of experience is
a nervous system. Nervous tissue is made up of
1 Valentine: The Psychology of Personality, p. 356.
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three orders of neurons: (1) sensory, consisting of
a nucleus, two axons mth their terminations in end
arborizations, (2) associative, consisting of a
nucleus, short "branching axons, dendrites, and end
arborizations, (3) motor neurons, consisting of a
nucleus, an axon connecting with muscular tissue, and
dendrites. ^Dntacts between end arborizations and
dendrites such as establish connections between neurons
of different orders, are called synapses.
There are two distinct systems of nervuus control
in the body: the brain and spinal cord, and the
sympathetic nervous system, viiich controls the
activity of the internal organs. These two are so
intimately related that the activity of the one con-
tinually sLffects th^other.
The day of the old faculty psychology is long
since past; yet while location of "faculties", like
reason, memory, etc., in certain portions of the
brain can no longer be held, there are certain
definite locations of function. External stimuli
result in the activity of the afferent or sensory nerves
vAiich connect at certain synapses in the cortex of the
brain, or in the cerebro-spinal system, with either
efferent nerves or the associative nerves. That is to
,1}
say, that in certain portions of th.e cortex have been
located definite sensory and motor activities; but
another portion of the cortex was long a puzzle to
psychologists. It was discovered thai/the cells making
up the neurons of this portion were different in kind
from the others; and that their function, unlike the
others was unspecialized.
Valentine says, "'.Ye must turn to the
cortex, to find the mechanism of habit formation. It
is in this intricate mesh of neurons, largely undiffer-
entiated at birth that nature displays the triumph of
her art in human construction, for it is the equipment
by meains of vsiiich all modifications in behavior are
achieved. Here we have a structure consisting of vast
numbers of nerve cells infinitely interwiven. Within
the plane of the cortex, as we know, certain small areas
are given to specialized functions in the production of
sensations and the control of bodily movement; but much
the larger portion seems to have been contrived by
nature for Ihe organization of experience*
"Such organization, we must assume, is effected
upon the basis of the interwoven nerve cells. Thus
we have the ground upon which sens6.tions are translated
into perceptions, giving meanings to wiiatever is carried
I/
I
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to liie "brain over the sensory paths. And we have the
ground for an endless association and interrelating of
these meanings. That consciousness M*iich in the infant
must "be a meaningless blur gradually takes form and
system as meanings multiply, and as the power of rein-
statement of meanings through images develops. We
seem forced to assume that this gradual organization
is due to the fact that each new meaning is accomplished
by a modification of areas of brain cells, such that
Tihen the appropriate stimulus recurs these cells are
activated. And we seem forced to assume that when
once this modification has been made it may became
conjoined in an ever growing pattern with any and all
other modifications in a manner determined by the
peculiar experience of the individual. And so it
comes about that when one area of brain cells, now
specialized, receives a sti;$mulus, that stimulus, or
the impulse to ijAiich it gives rise, may be passed along
from one group to another, always providing that it
traverses paths and systems of paths that have been
1
outlined by experience."
H» N. Martin, in his physiological study, shows
that through the associative activity of this portion
1 Valentine, P.P.: Psychology of Personality, pp. 28f«
* (
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of the cortex, reactions to stimuli may be modified
1
as well as mediated* Different combinations (connec-
tions) give rise to new meanings (synthesis, emergence,
adaptation). The direction of response to stimulus
may be determined by the neural paths marked out in
this portion of the cortex, and it may differ from the
response which \TOuld result from mere direct connection
between the sensory and the motor neurons. Vftien a
neural path has once been marked out nev/ impulses are
inclined to follow the line of least resistance, ^^ich
is over this same ja^th if contact is made at any point.
Thus the tendency of impulses to traverse this route
is strengthened from occasion to occasion and habit is
formed.
A most fundamental fact of observation is that
every stimulus coming by way of the afferent nerves
tends, T/^en it reaches a synapse in the brain cortex
and has been transformed into outgoing energy to be
expressed in motor response. This fact has been appre-
hended and utilized to its full capacity in the valuable
contribution of behavioristic psychology. The original
structural tendency to react to definite stimuli in
definite ways has been used by this school to reduce
all psychological data to the simple formula of reflex
1 Martin, H.N.: The Human Body, pp. 138 f.
r
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action, conditioned at first merely "by organic struc-
ture, later "by the association of organic satisfaction
and annoyance. Upon its own level this formula has
proved a useful tool and in the initial stages of
personal development, especially, must be depended
upon as an educational instrument. Most of the leading
exponents of this school, however, "would leave us here.
They would ignore the levels of activity which emerge
froa this, even the implications of "satisfiers" and
II
annoyers", and deny the possibility of scientific
investigation in this field which they call "illusion".
A more recent development in the psychological
world challenges behaviorism as a complete method of
psychological analysis, from this very angle; and sub-
stitutes for the behavioristic notion of the "reflex
arc" and mechanical "bonds", that of structural vvholes
or configurations, ("Gestalt"), 'ifidiich, being wholes,
are essentially psychical. (In passing let us call
attention to the fact that even tl:ie thorough-going
behaviorist relies in explaining modification of behavior
by "conditioning", upon the notions of organic satisfac-
tion and annoyance, and of adjustment; v*iich, so far as
we can see, implies awareness of a situation as a whole.
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conscious dynamic, the rudiments of purpose). The
leading exponents of the Gestalt school are Kurt
Koffka of the University of Giessen, ajid Wolfgang
Kb*hler of liie Universitj'- of Berlin, whose experiments
with apes have done much to support his theory, and
incidentally to reveal in a striking manner the
gradualness of the emergence of those qualities
which are usually associated with human prowess. Let
us now summarize Koffka*s findings:
He says: "¥e can» for our purposes, descriminate
two main theories of mental development, one being
unitarian and deriving all behavior from one fundamental
type, that of the reflex (Watson) vdiile the other is
pluralistic and maintains all essential difference
between the three types; the higher ones being, in the
course of evolution, added to the lower ones. According
to the unitarian school, the adaptiveness of reflexive
and instinctive activity is merely a parent. This
activity is not determined by the intrinsic nature
of the situat ion--but by merely pre-existing bond-
1
devices. 'JShen the button is pressed the machine goes."
An experiment YfaiGh was performed on a monkey's eyes by
changing the normal nerve and muscle connections does not
1 Koffka, in Murchison: Psychologies of 1925, p. 130
r
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bear out the natural expectations. The monkey s till
moved his eyes in a normal fashion which was adjustive
to the situation^
Then the problem arises, "How can a certain
result, rather than a reformed system of devices,
determine organic movements? Koffka shows by analysis
of Thorndike's cat experiment that the satisfaction in
opening "the door to reach the food comes after the
critical e vent , "aXter liie movement i/^ich it is
assumed to stamp in; therefore it must have a retro-
active force". If we grant retroaction, why does it
extend precisely to the really relevant movement
wdien the animal does not know that this movement is
relevant?" "--the situation forces the animal to
act in a certain way, although the animal possesses
1
no pre-established special devices for the act."
How is this possible? In an experiment with a child
vAio experienced a sudden change of reaction toward a
burning candle Koffka showed that the action was
associated not with the stimulus but with a perception
of the stimulus.
"Our direct responses to stimuli are receptor-
processes which in many cases will be on a mental
1 Koffka, op. cit., p. 137f.
rc
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perceptive level; such a direct response is, however
>
only liie "beginning of the total response: the percep-
tion issues in action according to its constitution,
the action is a natural continuation of the perceptive
process and is determined by it and not by pre-established
connection-bonds. Change of response to a constant
stimulus does not take place by alternation in the
function, ready made devices, but as a result of a
change in the perceptive process produced by the stimulus.
Lastly: a stimulus upsets an equilibrium on the receptive
side of the system; this upset equilibrium is a movement
viiich tends to bring liie system to a new equilibrium
and consequently the reaction must vary with the way
in Yhich the equilibrium was disturbed, that is, with
1
the receptor-process, with the phenomenal situation."
Therefore, according to Koffka, the reflex arc,
though useful, is not em ultimate explanation of
experience. "Learning consists in many cases primarily
in a chstnge of the receptor-process". It is not mere x
association, not "mereltying together of two contingently
contiguous ideas, or the selection of previously
established pathways by trial and error. This means
that the perceptive process has its own constitution,
2
shape, patterns."
1 Koffka, in Murchison: Psychologies of 1925, p. I36f-
2 Koffka, in Murchison: Psychologies of 1925, p. I37
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The question is» then, How can a situation force
an animal to do something vshich it has never done before?
"If we consider every response as the result of a dis-
turbed equilibrium we can predict that such a response
will be in the direction of a new equilibrium, since
1
every process in nature must conform" , to this law*
Thus, in the chicken which tastes once, and once only,
aji obnoxious caterpillar, "the receptor-process is such
that it issues at first in approach stnd after tasting,
in flight. Meaning, as a receptor-process, then has
objective signification," "— just as the concept of
meaning can be transferred from mental to neural
behavior, so can the other concepts we have employed
2
such as desire, disgust, fright, etc."
Thus experience is a process of integration.
In the case of 1iie child and the burning candle, the
flame and the pain grow together and become a unit,
then there is a change of meaning (in terms of awareness)
or in the receptor-process (in terms of neural activity)
•
Thus, as Koffka says, unitariness is an original
property of perception, and analysis is more difficult
than unification. To illustrate this, he refers to the
familiar experience of coming to a strange city* First,
1 Koffka, op. cit, p. 137
2 " H II II
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the city is perceived as a whole. But inside such
whole there is change. Gradually, certain buildings
and streets stand out in the concept of the city, and
articiilat ion of the units in the msinifold goes on, and
the idea of the city is reduced from relative chaos
to order. "Again our answer must "be that some kinds
aaid degrees of articulation must be inherent in the
original responses, for without this there would be
complete chaos, in which none of iiie other properties
could exist. Mere chaos can neither be meaningful
1
nor unitary* •* It is this unitariness, vii.ich Professor
Koffka insists upon even on the lov/est levels v^here
learning is possible, which he calls Gestalt or con-
figuration and ^-diich is the basis of his psychology.
Development, then, is the transformation of such
structures by the assimilation of nev/ parts and the
rearticulation of 1he parts. The cause of personal
growth, then, is instability of equilibrium of the
whole, and the tendency to stabilize*
Before v/e proceed further with a study of the
rise of meanings, let us pause for a moment ta regard
the notion of instinct. The i/diole subject of instincts
is at present in a state of dense confusion among
psychologists. If they grant their existence as
1 Koffka; op. cit., p. 141
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primary data, no two of them will agree upon a list
of them. There is an increasing tendency to explain
them, T7ith «7atson, in terms of chained reflexes.
Perhaps vie have been attempting an arbitrary thing
compaxahle to the old "faculty" analysis of capacity,
in our efforts to name the instincts as if they were
separate acts or parts of the organism or self. i7e
cannot pause here to go far into the matter; but there
does seem to be adequate ground to regard them as
structural in origin axising mechanically as chained
reflexes in adjustive response to organic set and
situations, but because adjustive, iirjnediately
emerging in consciousness and thereby undergoing
conscious modification.
Indeed, may we not explain all activity upon this
ground in terms of equilibrium disturbed by a new
situation; that is, in terms of the adjustive action
necessary in integrating new experience iiito the whole
of experience,? When we use the term "situation" we neaffi
here to include organic tendencies as well as peripheral
stimulus. The "hormic principle", or the dynamic of
desires, impulses, drives, instincts, what you will.
t
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then becQmes this tendency to adjust, assimilate,
integrate, experience into a \'\hole. It has two
aspects, the ideational and the emotional. The
ideational is the awareness of a situation and its
relations as gathered up in past judgments. The
emotional has reference to adjustive activity, is,
in one phase, the ''feeling" of the need for adjust-
ment» The tv/o are united in judgment (value judgment
always, and thus the emotional and the ideational
never occur separately) and purpose. Thus it is
that we say that affect and emotion are the dynamic
of experience, "liflien the integration of idea and
emotion is complete, so that purpose or intention
occupies the focus of attention, v^en the center of
equilibrium points toward a definite adjustment and
is surrounded with associated kinaesthetic images,
then the organism is set to function adjustively as
a whole, and response takes place. Entering basically
into 1he process is structural tendency. In this
sense surely we may ascribe reality to instinct*
This explanation of activity seems not to account
for disintegrating acts. It should be said, however,
that organization is a relative term: that the adjustive
reference of meajiing may be to^ivard a larger or small
c
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portion of experience held in attention. Integrating
activity is that viiich is assimilated into 1he \^ole
of experience "by relation to its larger value s»
Activity, however, v^iich is centered about the interests
of a monent and is inconsistent with the vAiole interests
of an individual, is destructive to the larger organiza-
tion. Yet even here there is adjustment --adjustment
to a small, xms table, perhaps anti -social, complex
of mental elements , ^ich occupies the attention.
The greatest contribution to the study of instinct
has been made by Analytic Psychology. Our attention is
called to the iiiree great primary urges, v^hich Psycho-
analysts call the ego-complex, the herd complex, and
the sex-complex. But it needs to be remembered that
these are the basis and only 1iie basis of further
development, and that the ultimatejproduct may be
utterly different from the original impluse . Out of
these basic drives and combinations of them, together
with specific situations, arise the lesser complexes
and directed tendencies to action (activities directed
toward^ end vs. mere unconscious reflexes). A complex,
according to Thomson, is a number of mental elements
associated together so as to fom a somewhat loosely
1
knitted system. Freud and his followers have
t.
1
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established the validity of complexes or psychoses,
^idi because of their emotional drive determined the
"character" or "set" of personality, "because of their
tendencies to occupy the focus of attention. They are,
to use their oim preferred approach, centers of organi-
zation or integration; and with those that refer to the
larger ends we may identify ideals*
The chief criticism against Freudianism is its usual
approach from the single of the abnormal and the negative
and its tendency to explain all data by its own psychiatric
formulae. Utilized positively it can achieve far more thait
it has already done in psychopathic application. It is this
that we propose to do. We propose, by establishing new
connections and associations so as to re -center the complexes,
to harness the great instinctive urges causing them to produce
values in the place of disvalues. Thus when the situation
A is presented, the consequent configuration will be B*C*D*
in the place of a f oimer vicious BCD. Our task is, not to
disintegrate personality by repression of the urges to
action, but to integrate it by leading these urges into
wholesome, refined expression \^ich will represent a whole
self in terms of all-inclusive purpose.
This leads us to an inquiry into how consciousness
can function to regulate the connections between stimulus
and response: and the question resolves itself
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into that of the rise of meanings. Professor Bagley
presents us with a yery usable explanation in terms
1
of function. We shall show later that this ia but
one of three handles by which we may manipulate the
body of experience; but this is doubtless the most
convenient for the explanation of meaning. Adjust-
ment, Sagley says, is the nucleus of mesuning and
self-consciousness. The purposeful character of
sensation is not obvious from the outset. He refers
to James* famous and felicitous description of the
newborn infantas world as a "big, blooming, buzzing
confusion"* Immediately, however, there begins an
association of sensations, reactions, feelings, etc.
until gradually they resolve themselves into meaningful
units, the process of unification being that viiich vre
call apperception. He states the fundamental law of
apperception: "the unifying of sensations into concrete
experiences is accomplished through the adjustments to
2
vAiich the sensations themselves give rise. Originally,
"the initiation of the reaction (to a stimulus) is
unconscious." (Reflex) "Then associations become fixed.
A stimulus comes to 'mean* a definite sort of response,
1 Bagley: The Educative Process, p. 66-95.
Bagley: Educational Values, pp. 51-55.
2 Bagley: Educative Process, p. 67
f
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the satisfaction of a definite need."
It all comes to this: we must accept, I think,
a capacity for awareness as an original datum. But
a capacity is nothing in itself: it merely refers
to that which can he, given the right caahinations*
Awareness comes only with experience, that is, v/ith
stimulus and response. It is with the association of
these throughc ontiguity and simultajieousness that
meanings arise. This association is perceived as
an adjustive process, and we have the beginnings of
self-consciousness. Awareness of relations arises
through configuration, affect, and conflicting
tendencies to response. Kinaesthetic images are
developed. It is found that ideas tend to he
expressed in action, and action becomes conscious*
It is in conflict of ideas, and therefore between
motor tendencies that volition arises; and it is in
such conflicts that meanings derive complexity,
intensity, and relation to a central end or purpose.
Bagley says that the threads necessary to combine
ideas are furnished by the sensations of strain
1
arising from reaction* Koffka emphasizes the
percept of the mass in the low levels of experience,
1 Bagley: The Educative Process, p» 71
•
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and he is right. Bagley emphasizes the neural aspect
of the low level adjustments, and the consequent
awareness of adjustment, and he, too, is right*
for according to our doctrine of levels, it is one
and the saime process. On the lower levels, the
emphasis is on the neural and motor adjustment.
On the higher levels, the emphasis is on adjustment
in consciousness. So Bagley is aigain right Ydien he
says that "reflexive adjustments serve until conscious-
ness is ready to take the reins", so the body (neural)
gives the "budding mind a few lessons in control of
adjustment before it relinquishes its authority and
becccies the servant instead of the master." "The
sensations of strain continue throughout life to play
the role of centraJLizing or unifying agencies. It is
they that weave liie thread, of continuity through
the disparate elements of our experience and resolve
the numberless data with \tiich the senses furnish us
1
into definite, coherent, and meaningful unities."
I think that without undue violence to his approach,
?re may identify Bagley* s "feelings of strain" v^ith
the "*feeling» of the need of adjustment" of which we
spoke a moment ago, and even with the awareness c£
organic disturbance arising from the interaction of
1 Bagley: Educative Process p. 71
r
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the cerebro-spinal and the sympathetic nervous system:
and so perhaps we may find in emotion (giving it this
broad interpretation) the motive power of life, both
of •thinking" and of"doing**. Then, on the highest
levels, appreciation is the bond between interpretation
and conduct, as we shall elaborate later and in the
mystical experience they reach their height of unity.
"Meaning may be defined, then", says Bagley
"as the marginal *halo* of possible ^cues'to conduct
surrounding every well-developed perception or idea
and endowing it with its essential and uAique quality
as an idea*
"IShen, in education, - - - we aim to develop
meanings, we are attempting to associate with the
sensations and sensation-compounds aroused by external
stimuli the appropriate axijustment to these stimuli.
Once these associations are thoroughly fixed (and it
is clear they may be most efficiently fixed by actual
reaction or adjustment to them), the revived percep-
tions (or ideas) will carry with them the various
possibilities of adjustment, and consequently the
ideas may later be used in "thought" problems as
condensed representatives of the former experiences,
—
« • • !
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the meaning tlaat is made explicit in any case
1
depending upon the nature of the problem."
•Beyond this, the original sense-materials
constituting the focal constituents of the percep-
tion may. Then the ideas are used in thought problems,
be replaced by a symbol such as a word, a sign, a
diagram, and the like. But the effective use of
symbols demands that the 'halo of meaning', T«hich
would ordinarily attach to the image or the perception,
now attaches to the symbol. So long as this meaning
is there the essential conditions are fulfilled. In
actual adjustment to real objective situations, we
need focal situations mirroring with precision the
relations of the forces and objects that constitute
the situations; in thought-situations the barest
trace of focal sense material may be sufficient to
•carry the meaning* effectively. In other vrords,
when Yfe think about our problems, the meaning of the
symbols that we employ is primarily important; when
we are using perceptual data as a guide to immediate
adjustment, it is perceptual data that are important ;-?-
we are really gathering new meaning around the percep-
2
tual data through the adjustment v/hich we are making.*
1 Bagley: The Educative Process, pp. 34 f
.
2 Bagley: The Educative Process, pp. 34f*
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There are three simultaneous processes, cr rather,
three aspects of one process, in the organization of
experience; namely, interpretation, appreciation, and
volition. It takes the three to make a unit or a
whole of experience. In actual fact, they cannot
he separated in their operation; yet for convenience
of study we may differentiate then. The first is a
matter primarily of the intellect, of fact judgment*
The second is primarily a matter of emotion and
value judgment. The third is a matter of focusing
the attention uoon the first two in such manner as
to direct motor activity. Yet these are not all
clear distinctions. For a mere judgment of fact ^en
dv/elt upon, that is, as it becomes more and more
differentiated from a mere percept, "becomes a judgment
of truth, vshich is a value judgment. Again, there
can be no emotion on a level above the instinctive
(that is, where consciousness emerges) which does
not involve interpretation of facts. The wider the
range of experience, the more the facts, and the
better classified they are, the richer, and often,
the more intense, will be the appreciation. Yet again^
volition is a value judgment involving the #iole self.
1 0
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plus the emotional accompaniment of such a judgment
M^iich tends toward motor expression and brings into
consciousness the kinaesthetic images associated
with 1iie contemplated act. Each is the action, not
of a part, but of the viiole self • One of these
phases of experience cannot develop without the others,
but one may be over-emphasized or neglected, so as
to malce a personality disproportionate*
We have spoken of the method of organization
as "apperception "A group of systematized ten-
dencies to reaction is termed an 'appercepti ve
system*. Each system represents an adjustment to
a phase of 1iie environment, which adjustment is
1
constant with us vdiile we are in a certain mood***
The larger 1iie apperceptive system, the larger and
more complex will be the v;to.ole of interpretation, and
the v/ider and more far reaching v/ill be the resources
for the direction of conduct toward ends* Hence, the
importance of the "idea** in an '•ideal'*.
"It is a maxim of pedagogy that apperception
functions most readily along the lines of interest.
Interest attaches most strongly to that which has a
vital relation to one's well-being. But in a sociaL
1 Bagley: The Educative Process, p» 92f.
i
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environnent» one's well-being is determined by
factors far different from those that operate in
a purely 'natural* enyironment*^-
—
"The essence of civilization is that remote and
not immediate pleasures govern conduct; remote and
not immediate ends determine action.^- The capacity
1
for this is entirely dependent upon education.*
The method of interpretation is judgment. A
judgment is the bringingjof^ past to bear upon the
solution of tile present situation* Ideas, meanings,
concepts, facts, principles, '^bring consciously to
bear upon liie problems of adjustment the related
factor of past experience, thus making possible a
response that is consciously adapted to the situation
in question." This utilization of past experience is
achieved through analysis and condensation of such
experience in certain ideational materaisl: "(a)
relatively complete sensory reconstruction of past
experiences, (b) partial reconstruction of past
experiences y^ich fuse with present impressions to
form \'iiat we have termed 'assimilation'; (c) mental
reconstructions viiich unite elements of different
1 Bagley: The Educative Process, p. 92f
•
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past experiences in new combinations ^imagination)
;
(d) symbolic representations of experiences or com-
binations of experiences that cannot or need not be
accurately constructed or reconstructed in primary
1
sensory terms."
Bagley distinguishes two types of judgment:
the practical ajid conceptal. The former is the
application of concrete experience to "Qrie solution of
a present situation and necessitates the "recall of
at least some phase of tkie sensory details of a past
experience," the reaction to the present experience
being determined on the basis of a former reaction
to a similar experience. But two situations are
never exactly the same; so tliere is always some
necessity for liie organization and condensation of
the past experience. There is always analysis and
recognition of relations, a synthesis of the parts
on the basis of their similarity or perceived relations.
In the case of 1he conceptual judgment the dependence
upon abstraction and comparison, analysis and
synthesis is even greater. "As experience becomes
massed and condensed, the relations between them are
less and less superficial and more and more penetrating
and fundamental." The purpose of education from this
1 Bagley: Educational Values, p. 36»
r
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vieivpoint is to give training and practice along
1
lines of discrimination and organization." Con-
ceptual judgment is the reduction of past experience
to principles* made possible through concepts. "iShen
an element common to many experiences is not merely
recognized 7fh.en it appears, but (1) is thought of
without being perceived, and (2) is capable of
being combined in thought with other elements, it
becomes a concept of general meaning and application.
To be a general c oncept, the element must be something
for consciousness apart from its perceptual setting,
2
ajid it must be appliable to a different setting.**
It is important to remember that "concepts
3
are abstracted from experiences not from objects."
^en y/e have given names to concepts, and have learned
to use words as symbols for concepts, we have achieved
an economy \«hich is at the root of civilization, and
we have tiie instruments with livhich v/e build our
systems of knowledge and our attitudes or points of
view* "A concept is an apperceptive system made
4
explicit-*4nade s elf-conscious". In conceptionaJ.
judgment Ydiere words are attached to systems, the
1 Bogley: Educative Process, p. 137f
.
2 Bagley: op. cit., p. 141 quoting from Hobhouse
:
Mind in Evolution, London, 1901, p. 292
3 Bagley: op. cit*, p. 142
4 Bagley: op. cit. p. 146
t
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word th.ua Tsecoines the focal representative of the
apperceptive system. In this way the finished
products of conceptual judgment are brought to
function as condensed experience in the facing of
new situations*
A very important kind of judgment, from our
point of view, is the intuitive, in which "parts and
Tnholes are simultaneous and immediate. --Yet the
meaning is entirely exact. The expert judgment is
self-conscious to the last degree. iShile other
individuals are thinking out what they do the expert
has it, sees the advantage, adjusts, and moves. --They
remain, therefore, as the final outcome of the judgment
1
function -- made perfect in its technique and use."
The two supreme examples of the power of condensa-
tion of experience into concepts are these all-embracing
ones of self and God. Of the latter we shall speak
later. The self, psychologically analyzed, is a
concept. Yet through all of the diversity there runs
a thread of unity. Our e xperience and our attitudes
constantly change. Sometimes, perhaps, this may be
a very slender thread and, in pathological conditions
it may be broken off altogether. But normally it is
1 BagleY: Educative Process, p. 155, ^yioting McLenon:
Stages in the Development of Thought in Dewey»s
Studies in Logical Theory, pp. 139 ff.
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a thread Tishich, in spite of i/diatever efforts one may-
make at modesty, is "bound to be the largest and most
con^rehensive of one*s concepts. It is with reference
to this ultimate self that all of the activities of
one*s life are ordered, either explicitly or implicitly.
Morality has been termed the subordination of indi-
vidual impulses to remote social ends; but morality
is possible only when these social ends caji be
identified with the highest and most permanent interests
1
of the self."
Thus it is that from interpretations arise the
materials which we build into personality and the
principles by indiich we evaluate the direction of our
growth. Interpretation is primarily cognitive;
appreciation is primarily emotional. The physiological
beisis of emotion is found in the activity of the
sympathetic nervous system, its connections with
certain glands and organs of the body, and with the
cerebro-spinal system. On the lowest levels, Yih.ere
consciousness is just emergent, emotion probably
consists of an awareness of the visceral activity
resulting from disturbance of the balance between
1 Bagley: Educative Process., p. 144
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the cerebro-spinaJ. and the sympathetic nervous system.
But it would be ridiculous to insist that emotion on
higher levels was nothing more than this. Indeed
there are very intense emotional experiences -vrtiich
are attended by a minim\jm of organic reaction.
'Ihe hi^er we go in the scale of integration
the more does it appear impossible to separate the
intellectual from the emotional* and the present
writer believes that ultimately, in a great mystical
experience, there is a synthesis of the two moments,
of "the supreme concept and the glow surrounding it,
into one vaJ.uc judgment ndiich has at once both form
and color. Of course, if we think of judgment as an
adjustment movement
,
sonething in the focus of con-
sciousness as being achieved , then the interpretive
does not function in the center of attention of the
mystical moment. But if we think of the experience
as the intuitive value judgment, so that liiere is a
rational content in the concept of the object of our
experience, then it seems to me that we may think of
the supreme mystical moment as a synthesis of inter*-
pretation and appreciation, ihe latter have become
one and the same. This is perhaps the secret of the
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sense of rest ani peace -sriiicii enters into sucli an
experience. As soon as rational analysis "begins,
then, of course, the emotional aspect diminishes*
±Jut the point we are trying to make is that our
value judgment has an object Tshich is or may be
perceived at the time as rational, and that inter-
pretation and appreciation are blended at such a
time into an experience, to use Spinoza's phrase,
"under "Qie form of eternity." It would be
scientific, if we could collect the data from the
mystics under laboratory conditions to conclude
that appreciation as well as interpretation leads
to ultimates. As it is» all that one can do is to
present testimony. This much we must insist upon;
that emotion in consciousness is other than a
physiological process. It is an experience with a
mental content #iich in its higher form is essentially
a Value judgment based upon interpretation. It is the
feeling aspect of the one process we call consciousness.
1
Coffin enimierates the functions of emotion:
1. It helps to bring the child to self -consc iousness
2. It tends to give direction to attention because
in childhood, the emotions, with instinct, rather than
1 Coffin: Personality in the Making, pp. 87-90.
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will, determine the interests; and axjcording to the
law of appreciation the later interests grow out of
the early ones# The emotions furnish standpoints
of interpre taition.
3. lliey help to crystallize beliefs, ideals, faiths*
4. They furnish motiTe poweE*
5. Emotion supplies warmth of personality, which
is the secret of true neighborliness, friendship,
brotherly loTe*
We spoke earlier of emotion, from another approach
as a^^feeling* of need for adjustment to a situation,**
so that it "becomes the dynamic -jidiich transfers the
ideational focus of experience to muscular action*
This element of adjustive reference in the emotions is
ijjiportant in the consideration of ideals, for it con-
stitutes a positive pull toward the realization of a
value. A mere affect which is not integrated into the
wftiole self, or which has not the "backing of either a
system of interpretation or a system of values vdiich
represents Ihe direction of the force of the self as
a ^ole, will accomplish nothing. But if interpretation
and appreciation are themselves consistent, if an ideal
exists 28 a possessed, really integrated wiole, then
*»
t
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conduct necessarily follov/s, for it is "but another
aspect of one and the same process. \?hen an ideal
is actually possessed "by Ihe v&iole being as a value
judgment without reserve, tension calls for its ful-
filment in practice. "Blessed are they who hunger
and thirst after righteousness, for they shall he
filled,"
We are ready, liien, for a brief analysis of will*
With the other "faculties" it was long ago discarded as
a thing in itself* The foregoing discussion,! think,
should illumine our approach. Our doctrine of levels
brings us here to a paradox. From the point of view
of origins it is evident that we face deteminism in
the emergent series. On the other hand, utien we con-
centrate our attention upon the third level viciioh we
have studied, the organization of experience, we are
dealing with an element of freedom iiriiich becomes
increasingly apparent as we ascend the scale of inte-
gration. The first responses to environmental stimulus
are entirely fixed. And each succeeding level of devel
ment has its content determined by the preceding level*
And yet Yrhen there arise conflicts between impulses
c(
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and action, consciousness steps in and decides the
issue. True, the self acts according to the laws of
its own being, i.e.t according to the state and range
of the organization v^ich it has already attained,
and to that extent is determiaed. Yet it acts as a
litLole, and its om adjustive action with reference to
a value judgment determines the outcome. The element
of freedom and of responsibility enters in at the
point of concentrating the attention upon the vhole
ideal social self, or upon a mere portion of the self's
interests. Volition is not a separate activity of
selfhood. It is the inevitable expression of the
blend of interpretation and appreciation. And organiza-
tion and personality are never completely real until
all three aspects of the integrating process are manifest*
A study in the development of personality does not
seem oomplste without a reference to that ^ich I think
of as a supreme level of attainment and have ventured
to call by the paradoxical name of "Social Mysticism**.
Professor Coffin quotes Seth to the effect that personality
is "this self-consciousness, this power of turning back
upon the chameleon-like impulsive, instinctive, sentient.
cc
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or individual self, and gathering up all the scattered
threads of its life in the single skein of a rational
1
^ole. It is something of this kind that I have in
mind in the use of Ihe term '^social mysticism". It is
my opinion that such an orgajiization of life as is
here contemplated turns outward rather than inward:
that it embraces an integration both with the world
of other finite selves and with the universe as a ixfoole,
including the great psychic Center of all. For the
experience of the integrated self broadens continually
until its interests and value judgments embrace the
universe. An individualistic mysticism is on liie
wrong track. It is through personal values revealed
in social contacts that we apprehend the ultimate
Ground of all personal values. It is in reaching
beyond ourselves to that which we have not yet
achieved that we grow to our true stature. We are
debtors both to Jew and to Gentile, to Greek and Bar-
barian. We are dependent for all that we are upon
social values, and true appreciation of Divine values
involves a hunger for the caramon good. It seems
perfectly possible that into the great mystical concept
of the Whole and the judgment of ultimate Value, which
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unifies o\ir being, we may, 'we must, gather up all
the social values suid all the lesser values of
experience. It need not "be a contradiction of terms
to speak of "social mysticism"; but with the practice
of the Presence may be combined the communion of the
saints •
Is this Psychology? Yes, ultimately, for it
all deals with the laws of psychological developnent.
Is this Ideals? Yes. Is this methods? Yes. We have
been trying to show that life is a process of Integra**
tion, a building up of ^iioles. We have shown that
complexes of ideas made d3mamic with emotion consti-
tute organizing centersjsr apperceptive systems -siiich
determine the direction of growth and which are
expressed in the activity of the flesh. And perhaps
the last section has suggested that for adequate inte-
gration an adequate ideal should be supplied*
D» How Ideals Function.
We had intended to treat quite fully various
proposed methods of control, and the matter of tiie
functioning of ideals, and we were especially interested
in the practical matters presented by Charters and Voelke
c
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but we sflialljhave to -pmss very rapidly over the
remainder of our material*
Probably the most popular proposal of method
among psychologists of acswiemic standing is that of
'•conditioning'^. Professor Watson claims that he can
undertake the education of any child, and quite
regardless of inheritance, so manipulate his environ-
ment» conditioning his reflexes and building upon them
as to make of him Tdiat he will* We object first, that
Dr» Watson will have original nature in the form of
structural tendencie.s. and capacities to deal with.
Secondly, we accept his method as legitimate within
limits, but fear liiat the child will be stunted in
development especially TAhen he reaches the adolescent
period of self-organization and self-discovery; for
mere conditioning by environment will keep him the
servant of environment instead of its master.
If behavioristic method is popular among scientists,
a perverted Freudianism is more than popular among the
JJInan on the street**, ttie housewife in the kitchen, and
the peddler of "psychology", who finds in it great
profit. That, too, would propose its metliods^ those of
self-hypnosis and licentiousness with "their train of
(1 I
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disastrous results. The doctrine of catharsis, \ihen
interpreted to caliper the expression of the instincts
and lower complexes on their original levels, contra-
dicts the law of repetition.
The truer Freudians are not so pernicious in
their influence, but their attack is too negative;
and their tendency to explain the higher( the sublimated)
in terns of the lower (the primitive) is unwholesome.
Neither does the reduction of al3|urges to one, or
even three with the emphasis upon the one, do justice
to the facts.
If these methods are ill founded or incomplete^
shall we attempt any control by indoctrination of
principles? Are there any ways of carrying over such
principles into actual conduct? Teaching by example
usually is the favorite answer to these questions*
The method would make use of the fact of imitation.
Unfortunately, however, no provision is made for the
selection of that ii^ich is to be imitated. Often,
too, mere imitation is on the lower levels that make
apes out of human beings. Even though the desire
consciously to imitate a good model is aroused, the
suggestion disregards the failure of the copy books.
For when the teacher or leader i&lo is imitated moves
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away or the imitator outgrows him, the copy will
grow less and less worthy of the original, unless
something deeper—an ideal, ^toich is held immediately
before the su'bject--has "been aroused.
Then how about precept, code, and formal
training? As long as they remain precepts, codes,
and formal training; they will be mere intellectual
propositions , assented to perhaps, but devoid of
power to carry them into life. Moreover, in a
dynamic, changing world purposive rather than
categorical standards are needed*
Surely, then, we have liie solution of our problem
in the project method. Let us educate by placing the
pupils in life situations i^iiich, under supervision,
will evoke their own adaptive powers and organize
their responses to given situations. Thus liie standards
set wil3(!have the intellectual backing growing from the
pupils* own. lives. Fine, thus farl But shall our aim
be habituation alone? Shall o\ir system degenerate
into casuistry? Or shall we use our project method
taking care to see that principles and standards
evoiTed shall be generalized by idealization, thus
I1 <
f
106.
made applicable to all appropriate occasions and
animated by emotion? This would amount to the develop-
ment of moral judgment in the light of the interpreta-
tion of experience and value appreciation, sind an
association with response by the way of arousing a
desire, as well as by the initiation of habit. This
would be idealization as we understand the term.
Our simplest definition of ideal is •'an emotion-
alized idea", and it is cogent. Eippihasis needs to.
be laid on both phases. An ideal is first of all
idea. The individual of greatest worth to society
will be the one, all other considerations being equal,
Tidio has the largest, most flexible apperceptive system,
is open to the most facts of signif icsuice , and who
interprets those facts most discriminate ly. Hence
the importance of two considerations in education:
(1) of developing the power of creative, critical
thinking, (2) of cultivating freedom from prejudice
and from ruts. The significance of tlie \*iole of our
experience bears a distinct relation to its range.
But an ideal is more than a mere idea* It must
be carried over into the expression of good thinking
in terms of good works. Skills occupy a high place
in the integration of personality. We are to be made
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"
•perfect in every good "work". Only a sense of value
in relation to the vitoole will motivate the sweat of
learning skill.
Bagley, in Cliapter XIV of "The Educative Process"
enumerates the psychological characteristics of an
effective ideal:
(1) It is a type of condensed experience.
(2) It is therefore often formulated as a proposi-
tion or conceptual judgment; or it may be attached to
one word.
(3) As a conditioned experience it functions in
the process of judgment. It is a conscious guide in
novel and critica2 situations* It initiates habits*
but is not habit, though judgment based upon it may
be •intuitive'.
(4) The emotional element is of the greater impor-
tance.
(5) Ideals are classed as high or low, according
as they are (a) concrete or abstract, (b) selfish or
social, (c) refer to immediate or remote ends.
Ideals function in conduct first of all because
conduct is merely one aspect or mode of a single process
1c
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of i»hich interpretation and appreciation are other
modes*
Secondly, they operate "because the original
drives are undiminished when new connections are
established. Voellfer asks, "If it be grauited, as
Thomdike says, that *the one thing T^ich education
can do best is to establish those particular connec-
tions with acts ^ich we cal^abits', is it also
possible for education to establish connections
with those general ideas i/^ich we call ideals and
with those general habits v*iich we call attitudes;
and csui it establish these connections in so vital
a way that the ideals and attitudes will serve in the
1
control of conduct?* Then he answers his own question
by enumerating five ways of producing values tlirough
the modification of reactions to stimuli:
(1) Dissociation of a response from its natural
stimulus. 'Learning not to*.
(2) Attachment of another response to an object
and to tile feelings \'diich the object instinctively
arouses.
(3) Attachment of an emotion with its characteristic
response to a familiar situation #iich had never before
evoked this emotion and response.
1 Voelker: op. cit., 0. 46.
cc
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(4) Attachment of a natixral reaction to a
stimulus that is not its natural stimulus*
(5) Attachment of a new response to a new
situation by way of old emotion, that is, sublima-
1
tion*
Finally, ideals function in conduct because they
create, as it were, a vacuum between the actual and
the ideal; "nature abhors a vacuum"; and the ideal
»
fixed in a system of wholes, draws the actual up
to itself. A pull is stronger than a push ^en it
comes to moving human beings*
We cannot say much, now, on the methods to be
employed in teaching ideals. In general, we should
say that with children the indirect method is
better, iisihile with adolescents and adults the direct
is often, though not always, the most productive.
In the use of the latter method the development of
ovep-self-consciousness may be guarded aigainst by
safeguarding sincerity and objectivity, and by as
rapid habituation as possible. Childhood is the
time to begin teaching ideals* but adol asisence is
the time par excellence for bringingthat teaching
to full effectiveness.
Professor Maf3a tt
from
I 1
4
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Charters enumerates the five most important
factors in developing of ideals: (1) creating desire
through discovering some means of appeal, as a friend's
faith in another, the vocational urge, etc. (2) diag-
nosing the situation. Success in developing a trait
will be based upon the ability to counteract the
cause; (3) developing a plan of action for ttie applica-
tion of the ideal in concrete situations; (4) Requiring
practice to stimulate sustained desire throu^ apprecia-
tive notice, reports, discipline, and to form habits;
(5) vriien ideals are generalized, they are completely
1
applied.
S. Selection of Ideals»
If we are granted the efficacy stnd practicability
of utilizing ideals as a principle in teaching, naturally
our next question will concern the selection of ideals
to be taught. We have aLLready indicated a social aim
in education, even from the viewpoint of philosophy,
Yiiich ranges values not in a wholly static hierarchy
but according to their contribution to social self-
realization in specific situations. From the viewpoint
of -ttie state and the church the chief aim should be social.
A list of specific objectives would be too bulky.
1. Charters: The Teaching of Ideals, pp. 5,6,
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General ideals then offer us economical tools for
social education. They will be based, of course, upon
evaluations. Coffin enumerates five kinds of values,
the basis of Tidiich is the satisfaction of liie demands
of the historic life:
^(1) Intellectual appreciation; (2) aesthetic
appreciation; (3) technical; (4) moral; (5) religious*
the last of \^ich is a synthesis of all the others.
Various educators, and others have undertaken to
ennumerate the chief values to be idealized in liie
education of children, "rheir lists have included
+
such traits as trustworthiness, loyalty, social
initiative, accuracy, social service, social sympathy,
social cooperation, social conscience, accuracy^
adaptability, aesthetic taste, ambition, courage,
courtesy, cheerfulness, dependability, resourceful-
ness, unselfishness, neatness, etc. The list is
inexhaustible and quite unorganized. It is needless
to point out that such traits need to be stamped in
by the formation of habit, and yet they need to be
generalized through ideals so that they may apply
universally. Then, too, they need, for full effective
ness, to be organized into life as a i^ole.
1 I
<
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The Christian Church rroposes a single principle
of organization for the ydiole of life» Indeed she
presents the only adequate ideal which has been
offered, an ideal ^ich in idea includes every
interest in life, an ideal Thich is supremely
emotionalized by personal values, and one #iich has
for 1900 years been expressing itself in increasingly
fuller measure in the life of the world. Ronembering
to keep a plus sign after it, shall we venture a
working definition of the essence of Christianity
as an ideal for conduct? May we say that it is an
attitude of reverent respect for Personality, issuing
in just appreciation of Persons, high ethical and
spiritual aspiration for Persons, faith in Persons;
an attitude T/diich we shall epitomize by calling it
holy love for the God-like; universally manifested
in consistently (i«e., loyally and intelligently)
purposive activity, isfcether with reference to God
or to main as object — toward the infinite, and the
finite in the light of the Infinite. No less the
activity than the attitude; no less the attitude
than the activity. The "consistently purposive
activity" is the cooperative promotion of social
r
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self-realization, liie integration of all personal
relationships in conununion mth the Divine. iTiis
is the abstract ideal. The embodied ideal, bo far
as realization in individual attitude and activity
is concerned, is Jesus of ITazareth, through ^om
his followers believe they know God — the Source
and Essence of Personality. The complete ideal^
^ich Jesus defined in terms of fully and freely
developing social, personal values — the Kingdom
of Heaven has not been realized. It is with the
means of its fulfilment that we are concerned in
this study. This is the ideal which we are proposing
as the ultimate principle of education, with the
conviction that it carries within itself, ^en
appreciated in the light of the Person of Jesus
>
sufficient dynamic for its own realization*
F. Experimental and Pragmatic Evidence.
Hot only is idealization as a principle of
education consistent with our theory of evolution
and of psychical dynamic, not only is it psychologically
valid and economical, but it is als^i^ready in effective
use. The experiments of CJharters, Voelker, Athearn, and
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others conclusively demonstrate tiie efficacy of the
principle. In each case, the records of tdsts of
children itho had "been without training in ideals
were compared with their records after they had
received training, and remarkable improveinents of
scores were discovered*
iiistory, too, is a perpetual testimony to the
lifting power of ideals. Nothing but ideals could
have produced men like Abraham, Socrates, Ghandi,
and Lindberg. Nothing but an ideal could have
caused Paul to say, "I live, and yet not I, but
Christ. Nothing but an ideal of world salvation in
the 3Dul of a Nazarene can account for the sweeping
universal movement Tdaich we call Christianity. Indeed
we come to the thought that nothing but an Ideal
embedded in the very nature of an almighty God,
could produce the universe of creative values. A
therough-going psychology i/\*iich completes its task
and sees experience whole, arrives at a triune
original datum. Infinite Reason, Infinite Love,
Infinite Persistence in Social Creativity; this must
be the objective grounding of experience. In so far
individuals achieve through social relations and

appropriation, a grasp on these elements, just so
far are they truly educated; and in so far as the
society of individuals achieves this grasp and
"becones harmonized, integrated, so far does
evolution achieve her goal and the Kingdom of God
come from Heaven to earth*
t
PERSONAL DII'ZEREHCSS
i
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A« Some Psychological Processes at Work
in Producing Individuality.
An understanding of personality andits acliieve-
ment requires something more than a knowledge of
evolutionary theory and of the principles of educa-
tion in general: it calls for skilful smalysis of
personal differences and their bases. Personality is
individual. A definition of selfhood wil^help us to
approach the problem of variations of personality.
The self is not to be thou^t of as an entity
apart from conscious content. Rather it is conscious-
ness of content; and the word "consciousness** here
implies organic relationships among the particular
experiences and aspects of experiences iidiich go to
make up the whole content. The very essence of con-
sciousness is awareness in relations. Even the child's
first consciousness, if Koffka is right, sjid, in a
sense, even according to Watson and King, arises as
aji awareness of stimulus and response in relation to
each other. According to Bagley, meanings arise out
of the 'sensations of strain** associated with function
or adjustment to a situation. Uew experiences "configure*
r
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past experience of a related nature, tend to be
assimilated through 'conf luence" , as Professor Hazlitt
would say, and create a state of unstable equilibrium
Tn^iich remains until integration in terms of adjustment
"has taken place.
From this point of view the self in the 13. rger
sense may be defined as that configuration ^ich is
the Yiiole of the orgajiized experience connected with
an organism; and all present experience is in process
of becoming integrated with the self. Sometimes the
term •self* is used with reference to a smaller con-
figuration or set of recalled experiences aroused by
a gi^en tjrpe of situation; e.g.» the child playing
lion; professional apperception as opposed to social
apperception. With very slight shades of difference
in approach the self may be thought of as an appercep-
tive system, or a self-organizing ccmplex, i.e., a
complex of consciousness which tends toward equilibrium
through tile organization of ex5)erience. The organizing
center is the focus of consciousness, but it is not a
thing apart from consciousness itself»
At any given moment conscious content might be
said to consist of a more or less sharply defined
*
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focus of attention plus a background 'configured*
more or less vaguely, the factors Tflfcich are^ost
closely related to liie focal material "by the nature
of the suhject's experience "being nearer the focal
point and more readily accessible than are less
relevant materials of experience. Professor Hazlitt
approaches the matter from a little different angle
and describes this focal organization of experience
in terms of "confluence'*; vdiich, she says, is an
unconscious element in thinking. (This amounts, when
one thinks it through, to a demand for rationality
as an aspect of the very essence of the objective
ground of experience*)
Probably one may say, then, that there is a Self
as soon sb the conscious organization of experience
has begun; and Personality is achieved, a.s the historical
life develops, in the measur^n yjiich organization is
accomplished in a manner ^Aiich produces intrinsic values*
We have previously stiown that organization of
experience is three-fold in aspect: interpretation,
appreciation, and conduct* All are interwoven and the
progress of each enters into Hie determination of the
•beccDiing'* self. Ihe first two condition one another,
and both issue in the third. In general it may be said
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that interpretation determines the direction, ^ile
appreciation fiirnishes the drive (though in actual
operation the two catnnot "be separated), and conduct
is the automatic product of the stabilization of
equilibrium in the organization of the cognitive and
the emotional elements*
Interpretation is the cognitive process of
discovering relations between the parts ora.spectsof
experience. Appreciation is the emotional process of
evaluation of experience conditioned by the cognitive.
Interpretation is the ideational aspect of organizing
experience. Appreciation is the dynamic aspect of
such organization. Interpreta.tion is purely cognitive
only at its starting point—^mere perception. As it
develops in judgment, the awareness (affective) of the
need to arrive at a true judgment acts as the driving
force, and when the judgment or problem solution is
achieved, affect appears again in the fom of satisfac-
tion. iTae hei^t of interpretiation is the concept of
the organic vidaole of experience. The height of appre-
ciation is awareness of value in that ^ich is represented
by the concept of the vhole of experience.
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Judgment involves, then, "both cognition and, to
a varying degree, affect. We have already suggested
that the conscious processes may be regarded as a
coming to a stable equilibrixaa in assimilating a
present experience into "the iR^iole of experience. In
scientific thinking, the process is primarily cognitive,
though, so far as it is judgment of truth, affect is
also involved. Before the judg-ment is made there is
a '•feeling" of mnrest, dissatisfaction, instability.
When a thing is said to be "known** there is a**feeling*»of
satisfaction, 8. sense of *'v»holeness*' or "belonging
together* with regard to the matter '•known**. Physiolo-
gically, this means that so far as the experience of
the thing "known'* is concerned, there is a state of
equilibrium within and between the interacting nerve
systems, having its basis in -ttie chemical state of the
blood and the body tissues. Professor Watson's theory
of "subvocal mutterings" may be perfectly correct,
80 long as he does not attempt to confineus to this
level of investigation. Psychologically, "knowing"
means that the conclusion arrived at or the tenet
held "satisfies" in relation to the rest of experience
as it has been organized in consciousness. This does
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not necessarily mean that it is logically consistent
with the rest of experience. Emotional associatione
may predominate in deteimining the center of gravity,
for they may attract or repel certain considerations
from the focus of attention. Other considerations,
also, enter into the determination of the configura-
tion, "Certainty" as a psychological state is merely
an intensification of the "feeling of satisfaction*
Ddiich characterizes the mental content called "knowledge"
and connotes an emphasis upon "Qie emotional aspect of
the experience*
The development of personality takes place, then,
through this process of stabilizing the equilibrium
of experience by adjustment vhen it is disturbed (as it
continually is, in varying degrees) by the acquisition
of new experience, and it is revealed in the resulting
"set" of mind viiich determines the disposition of
future experience. Both emotion and reason, inseparably
interwoven, produce this "set"»
An attitude has been described as "habitualized,
conditioned attention", vhich means that lAhen a new
experience occupiesthe attention, the apperceptive
system which proceeds to assimilate the experience will
t
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will "be determined "by habitiiated emotional coloring*
Bis remarkably keen intellectually, c apable on liie
inter^pretative side of unusually large thinking;
but his apperception is narrowed by emotional preju-
dice so that urtien he comes in contact with other
persons he is impressed by certain outward character-
istics, ^ich because he does not immediately analyze
their ground, arouse his antipathy and thereby conceal
from, him the uidiole truth ^ich would modify his under-
standing of the seeming qualities i?i^ich he abhors and
would allow him to assimilate new values into his own
experience. Or aga.in, ndien his will is opposed by
external authority, his emotions are so organized about
himself that he becomes under the circumstances incapable
of viewing the situation from all angles, and he is
sincere in his conclusions regarding its injustice
to him, conclusions Tidiich would be quite different
were he a disinterested spectator. Under such con-
ditions, an attitude becomes a narrowing of appercep-
tion through an emotion ndiich has become habitual.
It is possible for an attitude ultimately to enlarge
rather than to limit an apperceptive system. Such
an attitude would be one ij^iich looks outward rather
c
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inward. At any rate, an attitude enters into the per-
ception of and reaction toward a situation and
determines what elements shall Tae perceived and
reacted upon. Attitudes are primarily habituated
emotions, but they rest also upon some interpretative
experience; and they have reference to definite situa-
tions*
Chemical and Physiological Parallelisms:
"Mind and Soma**
From all this it is plain that the development of
personality is much more complicated than is ordinarily
conceived. Individual behavior is something more than
a mere chance connection by reflex arc betv;een stimulus
and motor response. There is variation in the behavior
of one and the same individual at different times under
similar conditions. Situations are conditioned not
merely by external circumstances but^ by the organic
state of the individual on whatever level that organic
state is considered. Part of the story of tiie uniqueness
of personality is found in the fact that environmental
situations are never identical; no two cases of stimula-
tion are exactly the same. Another part of this story
is found in the nature of individual capacity for
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assimilation and response. This is a matter of
heredity. And stilljthe story is incomplete apart
from the fact of awareness itself - awareness of
meajiing and value*
Whether or not we regard the chemical and physio-
logical as causative, a study of individuality on
this level wilD^prove illuminating. It is customary
to suppose that the physical parallel of conscious
life is the brain with its nerve connections. The
mere recognition, however, of the inseparable part
which emotion plays even in the judgnent of truth (to
say nothing of its dynamic role in all adjustment
including motor response), is enough to suggest that
we widen and deepen our search for the parallelism.
The James-Lange theory of emotion calls atten-
tion to the part played by the autonomic system, -(Hiiich
consists of those nerves \\iiich control the action of
the internal bodily organs and glands, together with
the ganglia which they form. The v/ork of men like
Kretschmer and Canon is producing more and more evidence
of the relation of the activity of these organs to the
content of experience. The James-Lange theory explains
CI
emotion as the awareness of disturbed equili"briuiii
between the autonomic and cerehro-spinal systems. We
are not ready to stop here. It might he well to inves-
tigate both the higher and the lower level. The work
of Kretschmer suggests that we dig deeper into the
roots of this neural activity till we discover the
parallels of chemistry and physique, the ^liiole body
as the parallel of experience. On the other hand, the
James-Lange theory, 'i/*iich defines emotion as awareness
of organic disturbance, brings us only to the level of
emotion wiiere consciousness is just emerging. As a
matter of fact, above that level, emotion always has
some mental content other than consciousness of
physical states. We have suggested else\i^ere that it
always has reference to adjustment, vdiether as a felt
need or as satisfaction in its accomplishment. It
might be thought of on its lower levels in one aspect
as awareness of motor strain or tendency to act in the
light of ideation; but more frequently it is awareness
of a situation or a concept in terms of adju stive
function. It is pleasure in adjustment attained, or
the pull of dissatisfaction, toward an adjustment.
From the point Ti^ere it emerges in consciousness it
is intermingled with cognition, and the highest manifes-
e
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tation of each is in their fusion in an ultimate value
jud^ent*
Ohviously, then, any act of a self involves
the readjustment of a T/\*iole» We are calling atten-
tion to the fact, that •'.'Aiether individuality be
regarded on the level of consciousness, or on the
level of physiology and chemistry, it is organic.
Consciousness acts as a Twhole ; so likewise does the
body.
The research of Dr. Kretshmer in his psychopa-
thic clinic, bears strong testimony to this fact.
He vrorks out scientifically the parallelism between
physique, blood chemistry, and temperament. His con-
clusion is thoroughly sound: **blood chemistry and
temperament are conditioned ultimately by every
tissue of the body. We shall, therefore, instead of
the one-sided parallel rbrain and mind, put once for
1
all the other: soma and mind. — The physical
correlate of temperafment is the brain-glandular
apparatus
.
He says that temperament influences the psychic
qualities m the following ways, producing:
1 Kretschmer, Physique and Character, p. 255
2 Ibid, p. 252
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(1) Abnormal sensitivity or insensi tivity to
psychic stimulation.
(2) Mood-coloring (pleasure or its opposite) of
psychic content.
(3) Psychic tempo: acceleration or retarding of
processes: holding hack, darting forward, inhibition,
formation of complexes.
(4) Psychomotility: mobile or comfortable movement
tempo*
(5] Determination of types of vision and imagery;
intelligence or psychic disposition.
In addition to these indirect influences through inter-
action of the autonomic system with the cerebr o-spinal
system, it is quite possible also that the activities of
the gland secretions spread over the brain structure
itself, thus influencing in a more direct manner the
nerve activities of the brain. "We shall therefore do
well to sum up under the notion of temperament such
psychic events as experience teaches us to be particularly
easily and frequently responsive to acute chemical
activity of an exogenous nature (alcohol, morphine)
or of an endocrine nature, that is to say affec tivity
1
and general psychic tempo.*
1 Kretschmer, Physique and CJharacter, p. 253*
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There is neitlier a 'brain-autononiy , nor a one-
sided secretion-autonomy, but rather interaction
produces personal development. This is a statement
of an aspect on a lower level of our notion of the
self acting as a whole - the fusion of cognition and
emotion. Kretschmer says, "How far, besides this
quality of effective organ, the brain plays also an
active paxt in the conditions of such psychic qualities
as the mood-coloring, and general psychic tempo, we
cannot as yet say for certain. The present writer
is personally inclined to the opinion that temperament
is largely influenced by brain activity (interpretation)
and by stimuli - i.e., that temperament may be partly
accounted for by the nature of early environment and
interpretation of that environment. Er. Kretscl-uner
produces evidence that the endocrine system acts as
a v^ole and more than that, he says that the parallelism
of body-fat-metabolism indicates the influence of other
components of the blood- chemistry thain those produced
by the endocrine glands in the narrower sense; for
example, the great intestinal glands have been shown to
have large influence on mental content. "In tlie same
way", continues Dr. Kretschmer, "in gross thyroid
disturbances in human beings - in cretinism and mjoccedemia
t 1
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the psychaesthe tic dulling is the most marked charac-
teristic. And vice versa, abnormal production on the
part of "the thyroid gland in Basedow* s disease produces
1
ajiv exquisite hyperaesthetic nervousness."
C Classification of Temperaments.
Dr. Kretschmer classifies both the physiques and
the temperaments which come under his observation; dis-
tinguishes two great general types of temperament, the
cyclothymic smd the schizothymic. ; and out of his very
minute data and his observation of parallels he constructs
the following table of general relationships:
CyclotLiymes Schizoth:/mes
Psychaesthesia of mood Diathetic proportion; Psychaesthe tic
between raised (gay) proportion ;between
and depressed (sad)
Psychic tempo
Paychomotility
hyp e rae s the t i c
(sensitive) and
ajiaesthetic (cold)
Jerky temperamental
curve; between
unstable and
tenacious alter-
nation node of
thought and feeling.
Adequate to stimulus. Often inadequate
V7avy temperamental
curve; between mobile
and comfortable
rounded, natural
smooth
Physical affinities Pyknic
1 Kretschmer, op. cit. p. 256
2 Ibid. p. 258
stimulus ; restrained
Isuned, inhibited,
stiff, etc.
Asthenic, athletic
dysplastic, and
their mixtures.
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Numerous are the attempts at classification of
% temperament or personal individuality. Ho'ffding has
a very useful classification on the basis of religious
experience. Probably the most generally satisfactory
classification is that by Jung into six types of
extrovert and introvert. Yet the most that can be
said for these classifications is that they are useful^
for they do not represent actualities. Jung calls
attention to real characteristics; yet one individual
may at least border upon a majority of all his types*
Even Kretschmer*s best contribution is rather in his
poihting out of the mind- soma parallelism than in any
actual fixing o f psychic types. Entrance upon the
ground floor in the study of the lowest organic levels
soma, does lend some additional insight into the nature
of personal differences, into the complexity of their
ground. But classification is at best an arbitrary
thing. Types do not really exist. If we exhibit a
type it is no longer a type but an individual. That is
to say, if we drav/ the lines definitely, not more than
one individual will fit the conditions; if liie lines are
% drawn vaguely or widely, they overlap. Moreover, classi
fication of personalities is like the attempt to
classify instincts; we may be able to define personality
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"but varieties of personality axe as numerous as persons.
Personality if it means anything at all, has reference
to persons.
Intelligence, Capacity and Special
Abilities
.
The problem of personal uniqueness, if our
analysis of personal development has "been correct,
comes to turn upon the problems of intelligence,
capacity, and special abilities. Professor Victoria
Hazlitt, of the University of London, has, from our
point of view, offered us the most satisfactory
treatment of the whole question. All thinking,
according to Miss Hazlitt, takes the form of problem
solution. Tile impetus or drive toward such solution
we have already described as a pull toward equilibriiaa.
It is a precondition, but not a determiner of the
intelligent act. "In as far as the degree of drive
differs in the same person from one organizing act
to another, the drive is presumably not the determinant
1
of so-called general ability.** She calls attention to
the presence of an unconscious factor in thought: "the
rise to consciousness of the ideas related to the problem",
1 Hazlitt, Victoria., Ability., p. 12
r1
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exemplified most strikingly viien a solution is
"accomplished in a flash; the one idea that comes
is so perfectly adapted to the situation that there
seems to be only ne step in the solution." '•^The
fact that this process may be assisted by certain
devices of consciousness such as delay, dwelling
on the problem in as many and as varied aspects as
possible and the maintenance of a favorable emotional
attitude, makes the process itself none the less
1
unconscious* *•
"The essence of intelligence is knowing the
relation v^ich serves the purpose in mind, and if
there is no purpose in mind it is unlikely that any
relation will be knovm as the result of presenting
2
the two characters*" (Cf. Bagley's theory of the
rise of meaning in terms of function.'; "This educa-
tion of the relevant means that one part of experience
is telling upon another; that not only does the
presented character tend to come into relation with
innumerable characters with T/^ich it has been asso-
ciated in the past, but that the present task inter-
penetrates the v/hole situation. Intelligence, therefore,
is defined as "the measure of the confluence of experience,
1 Hazlitt, Victoria, Ability, pp. 11, 12
2 Ibid, p. 13
rt • '
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1
or of the degree to which experiences are confluent."
Elsewhere Miss Hazlitt calls intelligence "the problem-
2
solving organization of mind." She presents tests
to show the presence of the unconscious factor, "Con-
fluence", on the sensory, perceptual, and conceptual
levels. Simply stated, confluence is the tendency of
one part of experience to influence another. It is an
aspect of that which Koffka calls "configuration".
In any given problem the first step is definitely
and clearly to comprehend the problem, and this "envisaging"
Af the problem is intelligently solved," configures"
the solution. To "envisage the problem is to select
3
what shall come to mind." 13/hen a difficult problem
necessitates a trial of solutions, the imperfection
may be due to one or more of three causes: (1) The
problem may have been indefinitely or incorrectly
envisaged* (2) confluence may have beenjpartial , or (3)
the experience necessary to the solution may have been
4
lacking.
Intelligence itself, then, is a constant within
an individual. An individual with a high intelligence
1 Hazlitt, Victoria, op. cit.
,
2 Ibid. , p. 12
3 Ibid., p. 20
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quotient may "be limited in its manifestation Toy a
peculiar environmental situation, i. e., by lack of
experience; and vice versa, it is possible, though to
a less degree, for an individual with a lower quotient
to seem to surpass those lAio are his superiors in pene
tration. The rdegree of confluence is inherited (struc-
tural). General capacity is not a thing vhich can be
increased or controlled by effort. All that can be
controlled is the opportunity for manifestation, by
providing stimulation which v/ill relevantly enlarge
the range of experience. "vYe come to the conclusion
that trying and persevering only assist the intelligen
act in the sense that they give the innate degree of
1
confluence the opportunity to become effective."
V^hat seems to be the increasing of intelligence by
control of environment or by effort of the subject is
really only the provision of liberating material for
intelligence to work with.
Though capacity can be shown to b e general, a
characteristic of the self as a v^ole, yet the
evidence of special abilities cannot be denied. The
question is, Are they the product of processes other
than problem solving by configuration , or are they
simply a matter of dealing with different materials^
1 Hazlitt, op. cit., p. 23.
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In memory, imagination, comparison, all special abilitie.s.
Professor Hazlitt contends, liie cue is still "c onfluence**
;
solution '»configurecL'» by the "envisaging" of a "problem*,
send differences are due to differences in experience.
Thinking is not interactivity of"faculties^but the
organization of experience by relationships suggested
by confluence*
"How little the mind is organized according to the
categories of language and logic is shown by the fact
that most people would find it difficult to give even
an approximate definition to innumerable v;ords that
stand for ideas that function and function successfully
in every day life. Further, there is a very character-
istic difference between the experience of merely
talking and of expressing thoughts as thejydevelop.
In the forme^base, the language mechanism repeats
habit-formation, all goes smoothJLjr but nothing new results*.
In the latter, speech is liable to be halting and often
there is no appropriate word for the new thought creation.
In discussing the bias towards formal logic in psychology.
Professor Ward says, *It is, as we have seen, ihe charac-
teristic of every completed concept to be a fixed inde-
(
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pendent Yhole, as it were, crystallized out of the
1
still-fluent matrix of ideas. » V/e may carry on
Professor V/ard's metaphor and|say that if such
crystals form too readily and remain insoluhle
in liie "still-fluent matrix of ideas'* they hinder
2
the life processes of intelligence." Very signifi-
cant indeed is this word concerning the importance
in personal development of openness of apperceptive
systems. Very essential, too, it is to maintain the
distinction "between logical and psychological forms.
The logician, says Miss Hazlitt, "may even tell
his reader all about the syllogism, and the methods
of induction, saying in the end that no one thinks
in syllogisms, or according to the logical methods
of induction. They do not, any more than trees
grow by the foot rule with V7hich their growth may
3
be measured*
"
In like manner the faculty psychology of Locke
is utterly deposed from good steinding. In all cases
of "special abilities" the process is substsintially
the same as in problera solving. The only difference
between "imagination* ajid 'scientific thought" is in
1 Hazlitt, op. cit., p. 28, questing from 'Jard,
Psychological Principles, p. 313
2 Ibid, p. 28
3 Ibid, op. cit., p. 49
I

138.
the problem itself.
"The clue to the difference between memory atnd
intelligence seems to be supplied by the fact that
people v/ith very poor memory (as tested by a number
of different tests) are much more likely to be lacking
in intelligence than people with good memory are likely
to have outstanding intelligence. From this, one
would infer that memory and intelligence are related
but that intelligence involves either something in
addition or to a higher degree. In order to callpp
the past in the form that is characteristic of memory,
confluence between present and past must be possible
but there need be little or no confluence between
parts of the present situation, or parts of the past/
experience. For the intelligent act, hov/ever, this
1
higher degree of confluence is essential.
Comparison, likewise, is problem solution by
confluence. In comparison, »the attention remains
fixed as far as possible on A, in the very act of
2
fixing it on B. Two subsidiary problems are con-
figured by the main problem, and these two configure
solutions in rapid succession, until the confluence
for the final solution appears*
1 Hazlitt, op. cit., p. 48
2 Ibid, p. 48 quoting from Stout, Analytic Psychology
Ifol. 2. pp. 168-169
c
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Analysis, synthesis, and the other "special
abilities" may he treated likewise. Special types
of imagery do not create in individuals special
facility in these particular kinds of thinking.
"Recent work on imagery tends to discredit the
view that people belong to types with regard to
their imagery. It seems that the kind of imagery
used depends on the problem to be solved. Prolonged
practice at solving some particular kinds of problems
may lead to an individual having the imagery
appropriate to such problems to a marked degree, but
this gives no ground for assuming an innate endo;vment
in that form of imagery. In the same way, an incapacity
for certain forms of imagery may arise from the absence
of appropriated experiences or from inhibiting emotional
effects in the early years. Even if there are innate
differences in kind and degree of imagery these would
not account for Ihe varieties of special abilities that
1
are found."
Perhaps the most significant word from Miss Hazlitt
is this: "If we give up the idea that there are
psychological a bilities, some of inhich are^ossessed
by some animals, some by others, we can conceive of a
1 Hazlitt, op. cit.
, p. 47
2 Ibid, p. 48
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continuous evolution of mind #iich fits the i'acts as
they are known. The stages in the evolution cannot
be associated with "the emergence of definite species.
The differences of ability amongst individuals
belonging to the same species are often as great as
the difference between species^" ^ In other words,
special abilities are evolved in the individual by
a cooperative process betv/een the adjustive capacity
of the individual, and the environment.
At this point we need, with Kretschmer, to take
inlierited structure into consideration: not that this
determines confluence in the special direction of
special abilities, but that physique forms a part of
the experience with vAiich intelligence works both
directly and indirectly and "through which it manifests
itself. Even as, for example, an abnormal condition
of the thyroid gland is manifested in a general
psychaesthetic dullness or its opposite, this showing
a biological background of general confluence, so, too,
will general confomiation have its general toning
effect as organic part acts upon part. Conformation
enters largely into experience both through kinaesthetic
sensation and through the results of adjustive effort;
1
Kazlitt, OT), cit., p. 47
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especially through social interplay does confoma-
tion cone to exercise a large influence in shaping
experience. In this indirect sense, then, inheritance
does determine special abilities.
Given certain aptitudes through conformation,
and given their discovery through exercise, given
also a blood chemistry vvhich influences the emotional
coloring of the experience of exercise, and we have a
foundation for the development of special abilities.
The direction in which such aptitudes will be
expressed will be determined by environment ajid indi-
vidual experience. Special abilities, then, are innate
only so far as structure and chemij^stry direct capacity,
entering as data into self-consciousness. Research
among men and v/omen of genius or unusual ability in
particular lines, has revealed the invariable fact
of the dependence of the ability upon exercise.
In other wo&ds, psychological factors within
experience, both determine the drive incases of
special ability and influence confluence v/ithin a
given field of activity. "A more verifiable and
certain cause of the differentiation in drive lies
c
142.
in the emotional and instinctive setting of the indi-
vidual's early experiences in regard to any given
1
subject matter." Since relevant experience is
necessary in the solution of problems, the degree
of confluence in a given field will depend upon the
particular form of past experience and upon emotional
ties*
E. i'reedom and Determinism.
Where is this leading us? ^at is the ground of
individual uniqueness? What is the bearing of these
facts upon the problem of freedom and determinism?
Perhaps we are being led vAiither we virould not, but
follow the facts we must. We are led back to the
parallelism of mind and soma; back to Bagley*s explana-
tion of the rise of meaning in the "feeling of strain",
the adjustive reference of experience; back to indi-
viduality as a product (1) of unique structure,
(2) of social experience, (3) of the tendency to
seek equilibriiim (4) plus the unique fact of awareness
in relations, of self-consciousness. We a re led by the
II
fact of confluence, the "unconscious factor in thought,
back to the necessity for a uncrersal causal, rational,
1 Hazlitt, op. cit., p. 54

and purposive Ground for the rationality and purposive-
ness of individual experience. \fe are led to a
paradox: to determinisEi and freedor;!, simultaneous
data. Determinism of origin cannot "be denied in the
face of liie facts presented by our study of individual
differences.
Freedom arises in the fact that through self-
consciousness and the experience of selection of
focal material and judgment (together mth volition),
in which the individual is aware of that experience
as his own, he partakes of a new nature and hecomes
in a greater or lesser degree a partner in the produc-
tion of persons. His judgment and its expression,
indeed, retards or accelerates the development of
ideal personality* In so far as his judgment is
integrating, experienced as the act of a harmonious
self, he is a partner in the Will that makes for
progress. In so far as his judgment is disintegrating
he represents a negative movement, and God is partner
only As Executor of an incomplete purpose. This is
not fgttalism, nor a negation of moral accoun tahility,
though frankly it is not the kind of freedom usually
conceived.
cI
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sTe have provided for choice^ in the matter of
attention. We cannot say that the focusing of atten-
tion is independent of a "set" fixed hy the past.
can only say that this "set" allows flexibility in the
matter of the focus of attention, and that the choice*
tile fixation of attention upon ends or ideals, is
experienced as the act of a self - a self "wiiich is at
once "bothjoreduced and producer . The self as experiencer
and adjuster is identified with the experience. Even
desire, 1iie father of purpose, is itself a product;
hut it is also active, creative. TJiere is no act of a
finite individual ii^iich is independent. The focusing
of attention is, in an objective aspect, the operation
of that "unconscious factor" -;7hich Professor Hazlitt
calls "confluence* in the act of seeking equilibrium;
even vmile it is experienced subjectively as a weighing
of values.
r
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By •fpeedom''^, then, we do not mean independence,
nor interference, not even a quantitative addition,
"but a complementary qualitative aspect of a larger
reality, of vidiicii the other aspect is determinism,
Preedom suid determinism are not opposed "terms* By the
former, we refer to liie livingness , the self-conscious
adj ustiveness, of experience, the consciousness of
acting as a self, a Mdaole, in the adjustment of inter-
penetrating meanings and values. By the latter, -^re
mean rational sequence secured by a purposive,
effective Ground of experience. Freedcxn is the
freed on^f partnership, and determinism is likewise
the determinism of partnership in every detail*
It seems, then, to the present writer, that we
come to a better understanding of these much abused
terms throiigh the approach offPsychology than we
do through the avenue of an abstract and a priori logic.
f
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We may sayi in the light of tiiese facts, that
it is possible to overcome wrong materials built
into personality, to overcome lack of skills, and
other disvalues which are the product of neglect or
wrong direction of activity in childhood or later,
providing life continues long enough, and purpose
continues firm enough, by the continual focusing of
attention upon the end desired, especially until new
habits form; and even then the watchdog must be on
guard. The positive side of this truth is a happier
one: that the focusing of attention upon desirable
ends and the means of their ac compli sliment may build
positive values out of lA^atever materials may be on
hand» regardless of liie absence of certain materials
possessed by others. In both of these cases, however,
it must be remembered that the very desire to overcome
or to build, from v/hich the purpose springs, is itself
a product. So far from causing pessimism, to the
theist this predominance of determinism on the lower,
becoming levels, since it does not exclude freedoi:! but
rather insures it in increasing measure, ought to be the
source of a dynamic optimism*
if
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F. Individuality and Social Mysticism
The fact of individuality is the complement of
the fact of social relatedness. Each gives the other
meaning and reality^ The individual can be an indi-
vidual, a person, only in a social world. On the
other hand, in a social world particularity is
fundamental. A v,aiole, if real, is not a mere point
nor an empty nothing, it has reference to definite
parts. The fallacy of the too simple in personality
building or in religion is a species of the fallacy
of the universal. It makes of God an infinite Zero
and of the finite person a circle with a vanishing
circumference. It produces hypocrisy, shallowness,
a halo of nothingness, sentimentality in the place of
reality of values.
Only the achievement of personality through
conquests of tangible realities in particular
situations can be the goal of evolution. The develop
ment of tlie "social mysticism" \^ich we described
earlier, if it is genuine and not a phsuit an, is the
interpretive and appreciational side of a single
process, the complementary aspect of \^hich will be
c
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described in terras of a practical social econony.
Indeed, the knowing of the universal Mind is
attained only through the social experience of
learning to appreciate and to serve finite person-
alities in and through the intricate and mundane
world of reality with vdiich we communicate throughyi
the senses*

CONCLUSIOIT - A UNIVERSE OP
THREE-FOLD UNITY.
r1
A. Metaphysical CheLrt with Explanation.
in our study thus far we have made a scientific
approach to the mterial at hand. We have appealed to
philosophy merely in order to open the arbitrarily
closed door to "the scientific study of facts on the
levels of consciousness and of personality (i»e» self-
organized consciousness). But Y^e have been leading
inevitably toward metaphysics. Hoif, briefly, let us
tie all these scientific facts together as best we
may in a philosophical chart and outline. Our con-
clusions may be right, or they may be wrong; but at
least v/e believe they have the merit of being built
upon sound psychology, indeed, if they are correct,
we must say that Ihey are an extension of psychology,
for they describe the lav/s and princ iples of social
psychological integration in cosmic terms.
Hence, we have here a case in which actual
presentation of a matter of science (psychology) is
practically identical with that of a metaphysical
aspect of the same matter, even though the two
approaches differ; and though the science, as abstract
science, addresses itself to a description of the
facts and relations, and is concerned with the weighing
9I
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of values only as the values and iiie process of
weighing are essential to correct description,
v^iile philosophy weighs the values for their own
sake, being concerned not so much with the true
facts and relations as with Ihe truth of facts and
relations. IflTe might say that science aims to
describe truly, -while philosophy looks beyond the
true description to the nature of its truth. Psychology
includes in its aim the true description of relations,
meanings, and values as parts of experience . Philosophy
incidentcjJly described relations, meanings, values in
its attempt to penetrate beyond them to their organic
reality or coherence. From this, and in this sense,
philosophy would appear to be more abstract than
psychology ,when the latter is considered on the levels
of self organization. Philosophy is abstracted from
experience; but Ihe philosopher may reply that
experience is a bstracted from reality. On the other
hand, philosophy is a datum of psychology; and if
reality is to be defined in terms of personality,
then the original datiim is experience in relations,
and both abstractions are merely relative. The relation-
ship is very close between the two fields of research.
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and liie dividing line too elusive to justify dogmatism.
It is possilDle, then, for the hypotheses of science in
their highest reach to he identified in form and content,
even v/hile not in abstract definition of approach and
olajective, with the principles of philosophy*
There is yet another respect in which this chapter
represents a synthesis. The experience of the present
writer has, for some time, been in common with that of
many others Ydao have felt a certain value and truth in
pantheism, a truth not yet isolated from its "background,
and v^io yet were compelled by a larger and more pressing
group of considerations to embrace pluralism. The system
here presented in outline seems to us to be a synthesis,
preserving "that value in monism wdiich so persistently asserts
itself, without being pantheism; and yet it is thoroughly
pers onali Stic •
We have spoken of the physiological (neural) as a
mode of apprehending the psychological. Shall we say that
the different levels of data that make up our experience
are forms or modes in which we apprehend relations \7ith
other selves? '^e may apprehend any experience on any of
various possible levels. The ultimately real is that which
we apprehend "under the form of eternity", have
found it easier to explain
ff
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the parts in terms of liie ?4iole, -tiie lower in terns
of liie higher, than vice versa; for in personality
organization we discovered the higher directing the
lower, viioles in the form of symbols for condensed
experience determining the adjustment of the parts*
Are we not justified, then, in assuming supreme reality
for the ultimate \Vhole v/hich we have shown to he
psychical? Are we not justified also in relating
the order of reality applying to the lower levels,
to the organizing conscious Ofenter of the ultimate
uniole?
It must he home in mind, Ihen, that the whole
thing v^hich v/e are attempting to make graphic in
this chart is fundamentally and throughout, psychical
and iinitary in complexity. Otherwise it will he
unintelligible. Especially must we he rid of the
notion of the self as a core, entity, or 'something*
other thstn consciousness itself. We shall conceive
of the lower levels as being, on their own plane of
apprehension, but not the ultimate explanation of
being.
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a t) re epTwe
"In the beginning was the Word; and the Wbrd ms
with God, and the Word was God." There was always the
three-fold Unity of Value Creator (Ideation), Good Will
(Value Judgment
,
Purpose, Social Attitude), and
Objective Thou^t within a Social Nature.
ce
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The chart, lest the likeness "be not r ecogni zed,
represents the universe, as a complex of psychical
complexes. We have described the finite self as
an apperceptive system. Here we portray these apper-
ceptive systems or complexes as subcenters in the con-
sciousness of God. Just as tiie experience of the self
is organized into a centered vihole, so, in order to
explain the unity of the vAiole system, we are led
to suppose that all Idiese separate complexes and
whatever else there may be in this psychical universe
are integrated into the larger Centered Whole viiich
represents God*s activity*
'fhe peculiarity of this scheme is that looking
from the periphery inward, God is the central Compn^ex,
other than the finite complexes, and the Twhole system
is pluralistic; viiile looking from the Center outward
all is God*s activity and experience, under self-imposed
limitations, and the system is, with reservations,
monistic. From the point of view of consciousness
of the ^i^aole and the will to stimulate and act
relatively to the detemination of the subcenters,
God is tile viiole complex. "The mere sum of the finite

complexes, however, does not exhaust him. From the
point of view of the finite complexes, where connec-
tions are incomplete, and even value judgments are
finite (relative only to the suhpersonal planes of
apprehension), we have mere selfhood, personality
unachieved, 8-nd almost complete otherness of God
from the finite viewpoint. ^JiQaere, in the finite
complexes, judgments of intrinsic values have teen
reached and realized, we have even from the finite
viewpoint, iinity with the central creative Complex
or Person, yet at the same time individuality as
an apperceptive system : self-consciousness as well
as God-consciousness»
This ccaitinuation of individuality under the
self-limitation of God gives him a social nature
within Himself, and enriches him as a Person*
Individuality continues because the infinite
activity of the Father (the creative Center of all)
is never exhausted by our value judgments. As the
integration of a finite personality does not reduce
either its elements or the viiole to nothingness,
neither does the integration of God»s universe
reduce either the finite elements, selves, nor
the lIBhole to nothingness, but it makeslrather an
1 <
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jpfinite, ever- changing, yet eternal, ever-creating
unity in complexity, a unity that can have values
within itself because of its complexity, its inter-
relations of personal meanings. Ihis is the only
possible ground for the reality of wholes and
universals; they must have concrete reference,
reference to particulars.
Obviously, not all of God's consciousness is
our consciousness, but all of our consciousness is
God's consciousness, yet under a form Y^aich recognizes
distinctions. We are subcenters in the consciousness
of God. As centers we are free. As subcenters we
are also ultimately determined. In every experience
of a finite complex, God is experiencing and cooperating,
yet, having committed Himself to tiie spiritual (ethical,
aesthetic, rational, etc) value of maintaining these
selves as distinct apperceptive systems, He is under
obligation to exercise divine patience and continue
the free aspect of the self, detenaining only by tiae
orderly stimulation of experience, which the self
organizes into a larger apperceptive system. Thus
the ethical and other personal values are preserved
ffhile yet we recognize that all is ultimately God's
activity and all is His experience. Evil is, one
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might say, God*s physical activity, ethically compelled
"by His determination to develop by the discipline
(not retribution) of law, personal social values in
the subcenters of His viiole consciousness; but evil
is not His spiritual activity, being contrary to the
ultimate purpose of the Whole. This still leaves the
direct responsibility for moral wrong upon the finite
organizing systems*
If we say that finite selves are "thoughts of God",
yihy not adhere to the statement, and recognize the
unity in complexity? Thoughts can never be anything
apart from the Thinker. Selves are parts of God's
experience, dependent. Yet they are also separate
apperceptive systems, creative, independent. From
the point of view of divine activity, of outgoing
energy, this is a contact with pantheism. From Hhe
point of view of finite self-consciousness and the
axdh.ievement of value, this is pluralistic personalism
pure and simple with emphasis upon "otherness*. Both
are aspects of one and tiie same process, '^enwe are
dealing with the metaphysics of creation we may think
ourselves akin to 1he pantheists. Iftien we are dealing
with humanistic problems we shall swing over to the

personalis tic emphasis. In supreme mystical moments
we combine the two. llais is paradox , but not i neon-
si stency . llie point we are making is that both are
reconciled in the philosophical system here outlined.
Beth are aspects of one process, one truth-like the
shifting units in a dot picture.
Of course, all this does imply that each finite
complex will ultimately either destroy itself by
disintegration or else will achieve personality*
immortality, "eternal life", by the integration,
through social expression of value judgment, of the
Y/hole of experience. And it gives strong g rounds for
the faith that, since the end pointed toward by
emergent evolution seems to be the conservation of
personal values, and since there is some integration
and value judgment in terms of ultimates in at least
every normal individual, and also since the resources
of the Eternal are infinite, iiie right stimuli may
be brought to play upon every individual so liiat
each may ultimately achieve personality. There is
reason to believe that the recuperative powers of the
spirit are at least as great as Ihose of Nature: and
that integration is possible through any approach
which is not consciously destructive of values
r
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(cf. Mt. 12.31), in which case there is a harrier
whidi must be removed before "eternal life" can be
experienced.
The Temple has many gates.
Though a life face any of the four corners of the earth.
Yet may it come and find entrance into the holy of Holies*
Though one look to the north or the east or the south
or the west, with eyes that lon&.
Yet is Zion*s mountain there.
Every truth is a cue to the whole:
Every life has some value
Which may be enlarged and related, until it leads to God.
Since we have Just mentioned emergent evolution,
this may be a good place to point out that we said
that emergence as a theory of evolution implied com-
plexity of origin. We are now ready to say that emergence
demands an coriginal social nature in God. He does not
emerge with His creation. He is the eternal Center
of values. He is the Source as well as the End, Alpha
as well as Omega: "In the beginning, God." "And the
Spirit and "Ihe bride say. Come."
The diagram with its notations, on the ^ole,
speaks for itself. We may call attention to a few
details, ihe inter-activity between the dentral
Complex and finite selves we have indicated by the
rays connectiiig" the organizing Center with the peripheral
complexes, ihe chief difficulty with the chart is that
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the necessary graphic representation of interaction
between the central and the subordinate complexes by
means of rays suggests remoteness in terms of space
and time, vhich is perfectly true on the lower levels
of apprehension, but Tsiriich is untrue on the higher
levels TNhere apprehension is immediate and "sub specie
aeterni tatis**
The heavy line outlining one side of each ray»
v;hich we have labeled, "Stimulation*, represents the
stimulus from the Creative Center, His activity iniiich
takes the form of our experience. If this is apprehended
by the self only on a lower level and no value judgment
is achieved Ydiich leads to apprehension of the
spiritual source, only the side labeled "Stimulation'*
has been outlined by 1he heavy mark. On the other hand>
in cases where personality has been to any degree achieved,
this fact has been indicated by the heavy outline T/*.ich
v/e have labeled ••Social l^sticism" or •Value Judgment".
The filling in of the rays between these outlines is
intended to suggest that the "two" activities are but
aspects of a single process. Our mystical experiences
are the natural processes of our self-o rgci.ni zati on
,
but they are none the less the still small Voice of God
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within the Soul; if ours is an iminanent God, He is
the Source of all. "In Him we live and move and have
our "being.
"
"Tell him that his very longing is itself an answering cry;
That his prayer, Come, gracious Allah', is my answer,
•Here am I»»
Every inmost aspiration is God's angel undefiled;
And in every *0 my Fatherl* slvunbers deep a
•Here, my childl »
"
(Jelal-ed-Deen, translated by James Clarke)
Mysticism is God speaking though the reason, through
the imagination, through a value judgment. Such a
judgment may tend toward contemplation of the value,
in \'diich case there is a sense of possession, or it
may tend toward a simultaneous consciousness of lack
of fulfilment in one's own life and a consequent desire
for such fulfilment. ".iShen such a desire is deep enough
and strong enough it creates a strain, a vacuum pressure,
as it were, that lifts the flesh along with heart and
mind jip to the new level.
In real mysticism we turn beyond ourselves. In
mere meditation, we contemplate values objectively
without attempt at assimilation by motor adjustment.
In meditative prayer, the value contemplated has
reference to God v^o is felt as entering "personally**,
i. e.
,
responsively, into the experience. In supplicatory
or i^eceptive prayer the value judgment is fused with
91 '
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a consciousness of disparity between the achievement
of the self and liie value contemplated, liie fusion
resulting in a deeply realized need or yearning to
appropriate the value, ^vhich yearning, again, has
reference to a responsive God»
upon the chart we have indicated the social
nature of integration in two ways: (1) by the dotted
lines connecting the finite selves, isiiicli indicate
the socisJ. contacts that come through the lower levels
of apprehension and lead to the higher understandings;
(2) by the arrows pointing inward and the quotation
••Spirit with spirit can meet", #iich are intended to
suggest the idea of the "communion of saints'* through
social consciousness which takes the form of value
Judgment in the felt presence of the Source of all.
Integration turns outward rather than inv/ard.
It means a rticulation with other selves and with the
universe as a Y^ole including the Center. Integration
with the Center is adiieved throiigh articulation v/ith
the facts of social experience, for they ultimately
represent the activity of thatCenter. So tliat if
I would serve God, I must give a cup of cold water to
my thirsty neighbor; if I would know God, I must
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"look upon the things of others" with appreciation*
Society is ultimately the stimulus of (xod upon me;
and my reaction upon society is the "doing* aspect
of my approach to Gr0d»
In a worthy mysticism, all the social values
found in life must "be gathered up in the concept of
God; and moreover, the value judgment involved must
have in it aji implicit reference to social adjustment*
But this is not enough: we are conscious not only of
a complex social whole, hut in a definite way of the
orgiinizing Center of that whole, whom we have "been
taught to call "Father".
May we say yet one more v/ord about mysticism as
a value judgment and its relation to reality? Value
judgment is a blending of interpretation and apprecia-
tion; it is a whole which at its height of synthesis
seems to be an absolute unit. Awareness of value,
Mshich is the sublimation of primitive emotion, is
intrinsic in the mystical concept of God, not a mere
illusory accompaniment from a lower level. This seems
to us to contradict any statement that values in ultimat
terms have no associated emotional glow, but are pure
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reason. If we recognize tibe intellecUial aspect of
self-activity as eternally real, ^y not also recognize
the emotional aspect of self-organization as leading
to ultimates, rather Ihan to consider it a temporary
"earthy" illusion? God may he Love and Beauty as
v/ell as Truth; so that, as Professor Strickland says,
"What looks childish (anthropomorphic) becomes the
actually profound", and true understanding may he
hidden from the v:ise and prudent and revealed unto
babes*
Value judgments are "under the fom of eternity".
That is v4iy some things survive the change of ages.
That is ^y we read the Scriptures and other inspired
writings today, "flie writers of Genesis were not "up"
on science, according to our modem standards, but
they perc^feved that in the beginning was God; I doubt
if hosea was much of ajfphilosopher, but out of the
depths of his own bitter struggle and the value judgments
at which he arrived, he came to know the heart of God;
Paul never heard of the theory of evolution as such,
but vsho csui read Komans 8.12-31 (especially in Moffatt's
translation) in the light of present day illumination
t(
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without sharing with Paul an experience "under the
fom of eternity"? Even Jesus, imiquely keen and
universal as was His mind, prohahly could not have
given a psychological analysis in modern terms, of
educational principle, and yet by his full possession
of ultimate values, he anticipated \*Lat educators,
diplomats, sociologists, and ••non-Christian" leaders
today are saying of him, Ytien he declared , "And I,
if I he lifted up, yrill draw all men unto me.*
One mere emphasis we must place; that upon the
three-fold unity of liie whole system. The rational
gains significance throuigh appreciation, hut neither one
nor "both of these enter into the stream of actual being
until they find expression in volition. The value
judgment Tidiich achieves immortality for the experiencer
is written in deed. Every value judgment ^ich is
genuine, unadulterated, tends inevitably to express
itself "in the flesh", even as the great concept or
Word --"Love," "Personal Value"^-- in the mind and
heart of God was made flesh. The interpretive and
the appreciative have not come to genuine equilibrium
about am tdeal, unless that ideal finds expression in
conduct. Only the triune personality is fully real#
»—
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Always, "Uie deed is the motor aspect of the
value judgment. Calvary is the inevitable objective
expression of Gethsemane. It is one and the same
process*
V/ithout this confined flesh my spirit woiild soar,
and touch the blue.
Nay, but without the deed and the skill, mind and
heart are phantoms:
I must lift the flesh, and, magic wonder! beyond
the blue
I rest in the heart of God»
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J3. Concluding Statement*
The achievement of personality, 1iien, is a
cosmic process, a progress from canparative simplicity
to unlimited complexity, from the nothingness of
mere capacity to infinitely exquisite order, from
thinghood to divinity. It is the process of
creation (i.e. purposive creativeness } , the travailing
of a social universe to bring forth values. Such a
process iraplies at the very heart of life, purpose*
to explain both capacity and achievement; it implies
that at liie very heart of the universe are springs of
reason, of value cherishing, and of activity, - vital
energy going forth to "the perfecting of the saints."
Such springs constitute personality. God can be
nothing less than personal; and having defined personality
in such ultimate terms it is impossible to conceive His
being anything other than, or in excess of, personal.
Back of the achievement of an individual personality,
tlien, are the forces of a universe. Into the making of
every person has gone the pain and the joy of an ages-
long evolution. With the arrival in the evolutionary
process^ of liie self-conscious level, where adjustment
and integration are experienced by 1iie individual as
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activities of a self, there appears a new factor,
freedom, self-determinism, alongside of a just-as-real
determinism of origin from the past. In other words
the individual TDecomes a partner in the process of
personality "building, "both in self and, through
social solidarity, in other selves. In so far as
biological inheritance provides individual capacities,
"biological inheritance determines personality. In so
far as society creates ideals, enlisting individuals
in their achievement, society is the makeijlof persons*
To the extent that the individual is conscious of
himself as adjusting his experience to an end he is
a creator of personality. In so far as the yhole
process is the activity of a divine Source, the
expression of a divine Purpose - under self-limitation,
it must "be remembered - God is the Father of persons*
In so far as a Man on a Cross gathers unto himself
the sacrificial passion of a universal ideal, revealing
the very heart of God, and to iiie extent that as such
he is lifted up and attracts sind empowers men to the
achievement of his ideal, that Man is a Savior of persons.
The dynamic of tiie achievement of personality is the
lifting power of ideals. The only ideal that we know

which reaches upward and outward to the limits of
personal value and capacity is that which for
thousands of years has been called by seers,
"the JiingdoKi of God", and which has "been in later
days illuminated hy the social mind of Jesus called
Chri st«

COMPRMENSIVE
Of Tliesis
THE ACIilJlVEMSNT
SUMMARY
OF PERSONALITY

C0MPRSHE1T3IVE STJIUIARY
Psychology is a frontier science vhich, Taecause
of its peculiar present status, will profit by a
little exploration in the tabooed area of "osmosis"
betv/een Science and Philosophy. The dogma of
materialism has decreed against scientific investi-
gation of psychological facts above ttie level of the
physiological, or, if it does admit such facts at all
to such consideration, it insists upon reducing them
quite arbitrarily to the physical level of their mani-
festation. On the other hand, philosophy when alienated
from science is prone to build upon thin air. A study
of the process of evolution suggests to us that the
description of physical facts is not complete explana-
tion; and we are led to call upon philosophy to save
us from the intolerance of materialistic dpgma*
In a synthesis of emergent and psychotropic inter-
pretation of evolution we find our clue to the principles
of viioles and levels. A nvhole is more than the mere
sum of its parts* As new phenomena emerge in the
evolutionary series they are more than the mere parts
which compose them. The lower levels depend on the
higher, are dominated by 1iiem. Just as various figures

ii.
may be picked out of a dot picture, so in the study
of psychological data we discern various levels of
manifestation of a single process. Out of chemical
combinations we find emerging organic physiologicaOL
processes; and neural activity taking the form of
stimulus and response. Associated with neural inter-
activity arises the phenomenon of consciousness, vshich
is awareness in relations, Geststlt, or configuration.
This awareness, while the product of nerve activity
in the form of stimulation and response, yet partakes
of a different nature from that activity, is other
than its mere sum. It is a self-conscious disturbance
and seeking of equilibrium.
From such awareness and the rise of meanings, are
built up organizations of experience, through adjust-
ment of a triadtis nature -- interpretation (cognitive)
appreciation (affective), and deed (volitional expression).
Organization is determined by the focus of attention.
The more inclusive the organic ^ole which comes to
equilibrium in an experience, the greater the integra-
tion. Personality is achieved most fully through regard^
in adjustment, for the largest interests of the self.
The largest interests of the self are identical with
0I
iii.
those of a social universe, so that personality
reaches its highest integration through an experience
ytoich we have called "social mysticism", because it
is an immediate a wareness of a universal Vibole which
has reference to social particulars. This "social
mysticism*, which is at heart a value judgment, has
as its complement the achievement of a social economy
\i^ich centers about the worth of individual unique
personality in harmonious social organic relationship.
Ihe principle of the building of personality is
the organization of experience around constructive
ideals, ultimately around a unprers!ial ideal. The
Christian ideal seems to meet the tests imposed by
psychological study.
The facts of individual variation lead us to
sense the complexity of personality. This is suggested
in Dr. Kretschmer*s parallelism: soma and mind.
Differences in individuals are so wide that close and
definite classification is impossible. The nature of
special abilities, as developed, and of capacity or
intelligence, as an innate unconscious factor in
individual development, brings us face to face with
the problem pf freedom and determinism.

iv.
Our conclusions set foi'tli three pars-doxes:
(1) that of de termini sra of oritjins a5/c::c .r-)e?.<: of a
fact which from another angle presents the freelora of
a self-experience in adjustment, (2) the paradox of a
^pluralistic universe v/hich yet l-as an clement of monism,
and (o) the -pe.TsAoy. of the synthesis of science and phi-
lcsoph;> in jc;> chclc^iics 1 stu.(?ies en "^"^.e hi •"'ler ^ eve"'.': ir.
'lc/ original datum of three-fold unity:
rationality, value cherishing, and creativity, find-
ing oojectivity in personality -- in a Y.'orId G-round and
in finite individuals.
f
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